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ABSTRACT
UNDERSTANDING DONOR-ADVISED FUNDS:
THE BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, MACROECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC
POLICIES RELATING TO AN EMERGING TREND IN PHILANTHROPY
H. Daniel Heist
Ram A. Cnaan, PhD
Donor-advised funds (DAFs) are changing the mode of philanthropy in the United States.
The lack of research on DAFs leaves nonprofit managers and policymakers with little
empirical evidence or theoretical framework. The purpose of this dissertation is to
provide scholarly research about why people use DAFs, how they function within the
nonprofit economy, and what public policies may most effectively address public
concerns. To this end, the dissertation is a combination of three peer-reviewed scholarly
articles covering these topics. The first article tests behavioral economic concepts relating
to charitable giving that help to explain why people use DAFs. The results showed that
lower prices of giving lead to increases in charitable giving amounts and that increases in
agency lead to higher participation rates in giving. The second article addresses how
money flows through DAFs to other charities, and how this grantmaking is affected by
macroeconomic factors. The study uses a panel data set of about one thousand DAF
sponsors over a ten-year period, and merges this data with four macroeconomic factors.
The findings suggest that money flows relatively quickly through DAFs to other
nonprofits, and that giving out of DAFs is more resilient to recession economies than
other forms of charitable giving. The third article reviews the public policy debates
around donor-advised funds and makes public policy recommendations. The paper starts
by reviewing the three major policy issues with DAFs: 1) the timing of donations and tax
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deductions, 2) transparency issues, and 3) the costs to the federal government. After
analyzing current proposals within a historical context, the paper makes
recommendations designed for the best interest of the nonprofit sector as a whole. The
dissertation as a whole represents a seminal effort to conduct empirical research on
donor-advised funds to better understand them and provide a theoretical framework for
public policy.
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INTRODUCTION
Donor-advised funds (DAFs) are changing American philanthropy as we know it.
Nothing since the advent of private foundations has changed the way that money is
voluntarily redistributed through sanctioned charitable organizations so profoundly than
the proliferation of donor-advised funds. A half-a-million Americans now give their
charitable donation through a “giving account” held by a philanthropic intermediary,
know as a donor-advised fund sponsor, and the number of users is increasing rapidly.
More than 10% of all individual giving is now going through DAFs instead of directly to
charities, and DAF sponsors hold over $110 Billion in Assets designated for charitable
purposes (National Philanthropic Trust, 2018) The largest DAFs now rival the largest
private foundations and the largest nonprofit corporations. But we do not know a lot
about DAFs, because the data on DAFs is difficult to collect, and the usage of DAFs is
not well understood. As a result, much of the conversations and debates around DAFs are
informed by anecdotal evidence or summary statistics. This dissertation work constitutes
some of the first scientific treatments of this emerging and increasingly influential form
of philanthropy.
Understanding the underlying decision making that drives donor-advised fund
growth is an important element to an analytical approach to the subject. The field of
behavioral economics offers both economic and psychological constructs that have been
applied to the understanding of philanthropic behavior (List, 2011). Donor-advised funds
help donors to maximize deductions for charitable giving, and allow them a lot of
flexibility for how and when to give charitable donations. By maximizing tax deductions,
donor-advised funds effectively reduce the price of giving for many donors. By
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increasing flexibility, donor-advised funds increase the agency of donors. Given the
limited access to donor-advised fund users, this dissertation starts by analyzing the
concepts of price and agency within a donative situation, by using online experiments.
Evidence for the effects of price and agency with online workers helps us begin to
understand some of the behavioral decisions being made by donor-advised fund users.
It is also important to understand how donor-advised funds function on the macro
level. Every year DAFs report some very simple metrics to the IRS about the amount of
money that they received (contributions) , the amount of money they have (assets), and
the amount of money they gave away (grants). By tracking these metrics over ten years,
using a panel of one thousand DAF sponsors, this dissertation is able to provide insightful
analyses on how money moves through DAFs over time. The article also looks at the
various types and sizes of sponsors within the panel. We find that different types and
sizes of DAF sponsors have different patterns of the flow of money over time. When
compared to macroeconomic indicators, we also find some interesting patterns. We see
that grant money coming out of DAFs does drop slightly in recessions, but not nearly as
much as the decrease in assets or contributions. These findings suggest that giving out of
DAFs is resilient to downward shocks in the economy and may have important
implications for how policy makers choose to regulate DAFs in the future.
The question about regulating DAFs has been a hot topic in philanthropic
periodicals and other popular news journals. The current treatment of donor-advised
funds under law allows them a wide degree of freedom, which is in part the reason for
their meteoric growth. Several reform advocates have suggested that more stringent
policies be imposed upon donor-advised funds sponsors to ensure the best interests of the
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public sector. While well intentioned, many of the critiques and proposed regulations do
not account for the underlying principles of behavioral economics, nor the empirical
evidence of the economic analyses presented in this dissertation. Based on a deeper
understanding of donor-advised funds, the last part of this dissertation reviews the
various policy issues relating to DAFs. Considering these issues in a historical context of
how government has traditionally regulated nonprofit and philanthropic activity, the
article provides a balanced approach to future regulation. Several policies are proposed
with the intention of maintaining the maximum freedom for donor-advised fund sponsors
and users, while safeguarding public trust in nonprofits and philanthropy. These policies
are designed to avoid unintended consequences and for the best interest of the nonprofit
sector as a whole.
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Abstract
Charitable giving challenges our understanding of human behavior; it benefits
others yet is guided by personal preferences. This study uses online experiments to test
how donors respond to circumstantial conditions in donative behavior. We vary two
factors, the amount of agency and the price of giving, to test how these factors affect
charitable giving behavior. Experiment 1 demonstrated that a simple choice set enhancing
perceived agency increased donations by increasing participation rates, but not the
average donation amount. Experiment 2 used a text entry mechanism to demonstrate that
a higher level of agency leads to even higher donations. Both experiments demonstrated
that price incentives strongly affect the average donation amounts, and in some cases
participation rates.

Key words
Charitable giving; donations; agency; price; prosocial behavior; altruism
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INTRODUCTION
The act of charitable giving challenges our understanding of human behavior.
Donors seek to benefit others, but also respond to selfish incentives. Those who give to
others do not maximize financial benefit to self, but do respond to financial incentives
and other forms of personal benefit. Andreoni’s (1990) conception of charitable giving as
impure altruism treats donors as quasi-consumers, who exhibit personal preferences in
their giving decisions, just as consumers exhibit personal preferences in their purchasing
behavior. How personal preferences govern the extent to which a person pursues
altruistic desires is still a matter of considerable research. Bekkers and Weipking (2011)
identified eight mechanisms that drive giving decisions. Among those eight, donors
consider the costs of giving, as well as psychological benefits and the alignment of
values. We test the extent to which the psychological condition of agency and the
economic condition of price relate to personal preferences for benefiting others. We ask
how these two factors affect giving behavior while employed simultaneously.
Giving money to others is considered to be a prosocial behavior, defined as a
deed intended to benefit the welfare of others (Frey & Meier, 2004). Consistent with
warm glow theory, prosocial action occurs for different reasons, including both altruistic
motives and selfishness (e.g. Batson, 1994; Oliner, 2002; Schroeder, Penner, Dovidio, &
Piliavin, 1995; Van de Vliert, Huang, & Levine, 2004). That is, individuals behave in a
prosocial manner because it serves their own needs, and hence, prosocial behavior should
be more prevalent in individualistic cultures. Using the World Values Survey, Welzel
(2010) found that individualism and self-expression are in fact associated with altruism.
Kemmelmeier, Jambor, and Letner (2006) found individualism in the US to be positively
related to charitable giving and volunteering, and that both were more likely to occur in
more individualist states. There are many economic and non-economic aspects of
charitable giving that may be tested in experimental settings (c.f. Zarghamee et al., 2017).
Our article explores two ways in which enhancing personal benefit to donors increases
donative behavior. We alter the levels of agency and the prices of giving in “real charity”
online experiments (see Eckel, Herberich & Meer, 2014) to investigate the relationships
that these conditions have with giving outcomes. Agency and price effects on giving have
been tested separately in controlled laboratory settings (c.f. Andreoni & Miller, 2002;
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Berman & Small, 2012; Eckel & Grossman, 2003; Eckel, Herberich & Meer, 2014;
Goswami & Urminski, 2016; Harbaugh, Mayr & Burghart, 2007), as well as in natural
field experiments (see Eckel & Grossman, 2008; Karlan & List, 2007; Kessler, Milkman,
& Zhang, 2017; Meer, 2014), and have been shown to increase donations in fundraising
appeals. Our study pairs the two factors of agency and price into one study and asks how
these mechanisms affect charitable giving behavior and how they interact with each
other. The findings from our study help to develop theory for how agency and price relate
to altruism, and inform researchers and practitioners on how they may be used to
maximize prosocial, donative behavior.
AGENCY IN PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR
The concept of agency, or autonomy, is a psychological element of prosocial
behavior related to individualism and is known to enhance the performance of the
benefactor. Human agency is the capacity for people to decide between options.
Weinstein and Ryan (2010) used self-determination theory to explain that those who
perceive higher levels of agency, or autonomy, while performing prosocial activities
experience higher well-being outcomes, and their efforts result in better outcomes for the
recipients. They measured this effect among volunteers, with findings consistent with the
theory. Other field experiments have investigated agency in a charitable giving context.
Eckel, Herberich and Meer (2014) tested agency by giving annual donors to a large
public university more options to direct the donation within the university. This
manipulation led to an increase average donation amounts, but not an increase in the
probability of donating, results that our findings will contradict. Kessler, Milkman and
Zhang (2017) similarly tested agency among donors to a prestigious university through
simple modifications to the mail response cards, allowing the donors more perceived
agency. They found that increased agency led to significant increases in donations among
the “rich and powerful”, indicating that agency effects may be moderated by personal
attributes or circumstances. Our study will use similar treatments by giving donors more
control over their donation, increasing their perception of agency, while modifying
various price conditions.
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Several studies have used laboratory settings to test agency and charitable giving.
Harbaugh, Mayr, and Burghart (2007) tested the responses of individuals to different
agency conditions (voluntarily donating to charity, or being taxed) with varying donation
amounts, by tracking neural activity using fMRI scanning technology. They found that
both the voluntary nature of a monetary transfer and the amount of a transfer affected the
participants’ satisfaction with their decisions. Berman and Small (2012) used
experiments to test the hedonic effects of donating money with greater and lesser
perceived agency, to see if people got more pleasure from giving when they got to choose
or not. One of Berman and Small’s experiments used the online platform of Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (MTurk), as a way to study charitable giving. We also used MTurk as
our method for recruiting participants in the study. In the Berman and Small (2010)
experiment, participants were assigned UNICEF as their charitable recipient. Our design
will allow participants more options for charities, as a way to augment the perception of
agency. We anticipated that augmenting donor agency will increase overall donor
behavior.
THE PRICE OF GIVING
In many countries, charitable donations are deductible from taxable income. This
deductibility effectively reduces the “price” of making a donation. The price of giving
can be defined as 𝑝 = 𝑑(1 − 𝑟), where 𝑝 is the price of giving, 𝑑 is the donation amount,
and r is the tax rate. For example, if a person in a 20% tax bracket makes a $1,000
donation to a nonprofit, the donation only costs the donor $800, because he or she
foregoes $200 in taxes – the amount he or she would have paid on the $1,000 of income
that was given to charity. So the price of giving $1 to charity, with a 20% tax rate, is
$0.80. Basic economic theory predicts that as the price of giving decreases the amount of
giving will increase, and a body of literature on the price of giving provides empirical
support for this phenomenon (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011). Auten, Sieg, and Clotfelter
(2002) modeled how changes in tax policies affect long-term giving behaviors, and found
that removing tax incentives from those in a 30% tax bracket could reduce individual
giving by 25 to 36 percent. Others have analyzed longitudinal, national charitable giving
data and found varying price effects (Brooks, 2007; Peloz & Steel, 2005; Tiehen, 2001).
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It is important to note that tax implications only affect those who itemize deductions on
their tax returns, a small percentage of the population, but a large percentage (60%) of
total donations (Deb, Wilhelm, Rooney, & Brown, 2003).
Andreoni and Miller (2002) defined a basic utility model for giving as: 𝑈* =
𝑢* 𝜋* , 𝜋. , where the utility for one’s self 𝑈* is determined by how an individual
allocates an endowment between the payout to self 𝜋* and the payout to the other 𝜋. .
After gathering evidence for how price affects giving, through a series of dictator game
experiments, Andreoni and Miller encouraged future research to test variations of price
with systematic changes in other giving conditions. They labeled other test conditions in
their model as 𝛾 and wrote, “Future work will have to explore the more general
assumptions that for a given γ the preferences U* = u* π* , π. ; γ are well-behaved with
respect to π* , π. and that these preferences shift systematically as γ changes” (p. 738).
For our study, we tested how giving preferences, depending on price, shift systematically
at various levels of agency. In other words, we introduced agency as another giving
condition, or 𝛾, and tested how agency modifies the price effects on the donor preference
models.
The price of giving has been operationalized in various ways through
experiments. Eckel and Grossman (2003) used a laboratory setting to find that the
mechanism for reducing the price of giving, either a rebate or a matching gift, makes a
difference in how donors respond. They then replicated those findings in a natural field
experiment with direct mail appeals (Eckel & Grossman, 2008). This suggests that the
rebate from tax deductibility may not be the most effective public policy towards
charitable giving. Karlan and List (2007) also tested the price of giving using various
matching gift programs in a large natural field experiment with direct mail appeals. They
found that price effects through matching programs had limits, that a 1:1 match was just
as effectual as higher matches (i.e. 2:1 or 3:1). Meer (2014) tested the price of giving,
using an online giving platform, identifying various levels of administrative costs. We
decided to use a rebate because we felt that it would be the most salient form of price
manipulation for our participants, and the easiest to administer.
Our paper develops the empirical evidence of price effects on individual giving
behavior by combining elements of previous behavioral economics experiments and by
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utilizing an increasingly popular online sampling technique. We use Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk as our online platform to collect our sample. This method is both quick
and affordable compared to natural field experiments, and even running labs on campus.
Thus it is ideal for initial, exploratory testing of theoretical assumptions. MTurk differs
from Meer’s (2014) crowdfunding platform in that MTurk workers are not using the site
specifically to make donations, and so our sample is not primed for making charitable
contributions and more closely represents recipients of an uninvited online fundraising
solicitation. Most significantly, compared to other experiments on the price of giving, we
test the relationship of price and giving simultaneously with the variation of agency.
Interaction of Agency and Price
While it is not clear whether and how agency and price will interact, because these
two variables have not previously been tested together, we make assumptions based on
research of agency with other factors on giving. Kessler, Milkman, and Zhang (2017) found
that the effect of agency with those deemed “rich” and “powerful” had significantly
positive interaction with those particular variables. That is to say that, agency had a more
pronounced effect on those who were categorized rich and powerful. While we do not
collect wealth or title data on our sample, it is known that MTurk workers have lower
average income than the general population (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). If
agency enhances donation amounts among the wealthy, it may be that agency has a greater
effect on those with lower price conditions. This rationale is based on the assumption that
a lower price of giving effectively increases the “buying power” of a participant’s
endowment in an experimental setting.
MEASUREMENTS OF GIVING
Experiments on fundraising and charitable giving commonly employ three
outcome variables designed to measure treatment effects on both the extensive and
intensive margins of giving. These measures consist of the unconditional average
donation, participation rate and conditional average donation (see Karlan and List, 2007).
The unconditional average donation is the total amount of donations divided by the total
number of those being solicited – in this study, all participants. The participation rate is
the percentage of those solicited who make any donation, regardless of the amount. The
conditional average donation is calculated as the mean donation among only those who
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give. These measurements suggest that charitable giving behavior includes two basic
decisions: whether or not to give, and how much to give. We seek to understand how
agency and price affect both of these decision making processes.

METHODS
In order to test our assumptions about agency and price, two randomized
controlled trials were conducted online. Each experiment recruited participants using
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). This method is widely used in marketing,
psychology, and other fields, and it provides researchers with a platform to quickly and
inexpensively test theoretical assumptions. Samples from MTurk are more representative
of the larger society than groups of students on college campuses (Paolacci, Chandler &
Ipeirotis, 2010). MTurk is affordable. It cost us less than $300 to collect a sample of 400
participants. We paid each participant $0.50 to take a 2-minute survey (equivalent to a
$15/hour payment). When we ran our experiments, we collected 400 responses for each
experiment in less than an hour. Our experiments were conducted several weeks apart
from each other, and collected samples from different M-Turk workers. We also
restricted participation to U.S. based workers only, because the nonprofits we used are
mostly located in the U.S. and would be more familiar to a U.S. sample. We did not
choose other restrictions, because we wanted our findings to be more generalizable and
useful in fundraising contexts in which large groups of people are being solicited.
In the experiments, respondents were told that they had the chance to win a $10
bonus. One participant in each experiment was awarded the bonus, but the participants
were not aware of that probability, so they had no way to calculate the expected value of
the bonus. We then asked each participant to consider a donation to a charitable
organization, should they win the bonus. This strategy was used by Goswami and
Urminsky (2016) to test other aspects of charitable giving. The potential bonus is similar
to endowing a participant with a lottery ticket, which is known to maintain value for the
participant (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991).
After being informed of the potential bonus, each participant was randomly
assigned to one of eight different giving scenarios in which they could use the potential
$10 bonus to donate to a charitable organization in $1 increments. The eight scenarios
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came from a 2 x 4 design, in which there were two agency conditions and four prices of
giving (see Appendix A). Participants only made one giving decision during the
experiment, based on their particular scenario. Thus we compare giving choices across
subjects, not within subjects, for varying price and agency conditions. We chose an
across-subject design to eliminate effects of price referencing from other conditions. We
also did not want to confound agency effects, by allowing participants to compare various
agency treatments.
Once the participants made a giving decision, they were asked a short series of
questions consisting of manipulation checks and questions about potential covariates.
After the surveys were completed, one of the participants in each experiment was
selected, using a random number generator and then picking that number respondent. The
participant was transferred the bonus money through MTurk payment system. If there
was a donation chosen by that participant, the donation was made online by the authors
and the donation receipt was emailed to the MTurk participant to prove the fulfillment of
the donation.
Price Variations
The experiments used the same price variations, across both the control and
treatment groups. Participants were randomly assigned one of four prices of giving: $1,
$0.80, $0.50, and $0.20. The four prices of giving were operationalized through an
immediate rebate. For the $1 condition, there was no rebate, and participants were
informed that every dollar they donated to the charity would be deducted from their
potential bonus. For the $0.80 condition, participants were informed that for every dollar
they donated out of the bonus, they would get $0.20 back—so the donation of $1 would
only cost them $0.80. Likewise, the rebate for the $0.50 price condition was $0.50; and
the rebate for the $0.20 price of giving was $0.80. Participants were presented a table that
indicated all of the possible choices for giving and how much their potential bonus would
be (see Appendix A). This table was the result of feedback from pilot groups. It
minimized any calculation the participant had to do, and was designed to clarify the
rebate mechanism.
Manipulation check and covariates
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Following the giving decision in each experiment, respondents were asked several
questions as a manipulation check to see if the treatment altered the participant’s
perceived agency in giving. The check consisted of three items that asked respondents to
rate on a 5-point Likert scale how much they agreed with the statements (1= agree, 5 =
disagree): 1. “I was able to choose where I would donate”; 2. “I was able to choose how
much I would donate”; and 3. “I had complete control over my donation decision.”
Regarding the second question, there should not have been a significant variation, as
participants in both control and treatment groups were given the same price variations.
This was included to detect response bias, if any.
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk does not provide any demographic or other
information on individual workers. This information has to collected via survey and adds
to the expense of the survey. We surveyed each participant on three covariates known to
correlate closely with giving behavior. We asked about charitable giving amounts to
other nonprofits in the past 12 months, volunteer activity in the past 12 months, and
religious attendance. Paolacci, Chandler and Ipeirotis (2010) noted that MTurk workers
have a lower average income than the U.S. average. We did not ask about income
because of space constraints, concerns about the integrity of response data, and because
the other covariates are also known to be strong correlates with giving, when controlling
for income variation. We then used the data on covariates to test the randomization
process, to be sure that our findings are not confounded with random variation between
groups on factors known to influence giving. We used t-tests between the agency
treatment and control conditions and one-way ANOVAs to test differences between price
variations. In Experiment 1, we found no statistically significant differences for any of
our covariates between any of the cells. In Experiment 2, we found that the control group
had significantly higher religious attendance than the treatment group, as will be
discussed later. Because religious attendance is significantly different in this group, we
will include religion as a covariate in the relevant analyses. We acknowledge that this
difference suggests that we collected too few covariates, and that we are limited in our
ability to test the randomization of our samples.
THE EXPRIMENTS
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Experiment 1 – Drop-down list
For the first experiment, the control condition (no choice), participants were
randomly assigned one of ten possible charities, taken from a list of the top ten charities
in the United States for donations received (Forbes, 2016): United Way, Red Cross,
Feeding America, Salvation Army, YMCA, St. Jude's Children's Research Hospital, Food
for the Poor, Boys and Girls Club, Catholic Relief Services, Goodwill Industries. These
charities were selected because of their likeliness to be recognized, and to represent a
variety of causes. The charities were pre-tested in a pilot survey, and due to feedback the
Red Cross was added to the list and Task Force for Global Health was dropped. The
control group had no ability to choose which charity they were assigned and they did not
see the list of the other charities (See Appendix B).
The agency treatment in the first experiment allowed participants to pick a charity
from a list of ten charities, using a drop-down list (see Appendix C). The same list of ten
charities was used as the list in the control condition. In the agency treatment, the
participants could see the options and make their own decision from the choice set, which
charity they would prefer to give to. This treatment is intended to increase the agency of
donors in regards to where they direct a donation. The decision of where to give enhances
with the mechanism of “aligning values” identified by Bekkers and Weipking (2011), and
would theoretically increase their willingness to donate.
Results
We first tested both the control and treatment groups for any significant difference
in donations between the choices of ten charities from the drop-down list, using a oneway analysis of variance (ANOVA). We found no significant variance in donation
amounts within either the assigned charities in the control group: F (9,192) = 0.96, p =
0.48, or the chosen charities in the treatment group: F (9,192) = 1.53, p = 0.14. We then
tested responses to the manipulation checks to determine whether the treatment had any
effect on the perceived agency of participants. On a 5 point Likert scale where 1 is
“strongly disagree” and 5 is “strongly agree”, those with the drop-down list more strongly
agreed that they had control over “where to donate”, (M = 4.45, SD = 1.01) than those
who were assigned a charity (M = 2.07, SD = 1.63), t (403) = 17.66, p < .001 (see Table
1). The treatment group also had a small but significant increase in the perceived agency
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of the broader “donation decision” with virtually no difference in the perceived agency
for “how much to donate”, as would be expected (see Appendix D).
We then investigate our primary research question: how do agency and price
affect giving participation rates and average donation amounts? Table 1 presents the
differences in means between our agency treatment and control groups. We find some
initial evidence that augmented agency increased participation rates, but not necessarily
donation amounts. When comparing the various price variations to the control condition
of $1 price of giving using pairwise t-tests, we find strong evidence that lowering prices
does increase giving amounts, but not necessarily participation rates (see Table 2). The
only price for which participation rates significantly increase is in the most extreme,
$0.20 price condition.
Table 1. Experiment 1 participation rates and average donations by agency
condition, with t-tests for differences in means between the agency treatment and
control condition.

Agency
Condition:
Control
Condition (no
choice)

Perceived
Agency
(where to
donate)

Unconditional
Average
Donation

Participation
Rate

Conditional
Average Donation

$3.07

57.4%

$5.34

(2.56)

(.51)

(3.28)

$3.78

69.5%

$5.44

(3.27)

(.50)

(3.27)

$0.71 *

12.1% **

$0.10 (n/s)

2.07
(1.63)

n=202
Agency
Treatment
(drop-down
list)

4.45
(1.01)

n=203
Difference:

2.38 ***

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. P-values from t-tests of differences in means
indicated by: * for p<.05, ** for p<.01, *** for p<.001
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Table 2. Experiment 1 participation rates and average donations by price
variations, with pair-wise t-tests for differences in means between each variation
and the $1 price of giving.
Unconditional
Average Donation

Participation Rate

Conditiona
l Average
Donation

1$ (control)

$2.17

58.8%

$3.68

n=102

(2.53)

(.49)

(2.30)

$0.80

$2.63

56.4%

$4.67

n=101

(3.39)

(.50)

(3.29)

Difference from control:

$0.46

-02.4%

$0.99 *

$0.50

$3.40

63.1%

$5.38

n=103

(3.75)

(.54)

(3.39)

$1.23 **

04.3%

$1.70 ***

$0.20

$5.56

75.8%

$7.33

n=99

(4.09)

(.43)

(2.99)

$3.39 ***

16.9% **

$3.65 ***

Price of giving:

Difference from control:

Difference from control:

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. P-values from t-tests of differences in means
indicated by: * for p<.05, ** for p<.01, *** for p<.001
We further tested our main effects as well as an interaction between agency and
price using regression analyses. Table 3 presents the results from the regression models
for each giving outcome - unconditional giving, participation, and conditional giving. For
the regressions of unconditional and conditional donations, we used OLS regression, and
for the models on participation we used logistic regressions reporting odds ratios. We
used our treatment and our price variable as dependent variables in the first model for
each outcome, and then we add an interaction term to test for the interaction between
price and agency. From Table 3, we interpret that providing participants a drop-down list
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increases the odds of participation by 69.3%, which results in a $0.69 increase in
donation per participant, but does not significantly increase the average donation amount
amount those who donate. Decreasing the price, however, does significantly increase
average donations and the participation, which increases the unconditional donation
amounts. We did not find a significant interaction effect between agency and price in any
of the models for the various giving outcomes. However, it could be that our sample size
is not large enough to detect this interaction.
Table 3. Regressions of Giving Outcomes, Testing Interaction of Agency Treatment
and Price
Unconditional
Conditional
Donations
Participation
Donations (Excluding
(Including $0)
$0)
odds
odds
b/se
b/se
ratio /se ratio /se b/se
b/se
Treatment
0.685*
-0.072
1.693*
1.221
0.04
-0.552
(drop-down
List)
(-0.347) (-0.849) (0.356)
(0.613)
(-0.381)
(-0.948)
1.085**
Price
*
0.627
1.285** 1.052
1.184*** 0.839
(high to low)
(-0.156) (-0.494) (0.122)
(0.310)
(-0.167)
(-0.533)
Treatment x Price
0.304
1.146
0.227
(-0.311)
(0.219)
(-0.334)
Constant
0.379
0.76
0.729
0.851
2.294*** 2.597***
(-0.457) (-0.602) (0.198)
(0.296)
(-0.514)
(-0.68)
Observations
405
405
405
405
257
257
R-squared
0.12
0.12
0.17
0.17
Adjusted Rsquared
0.11
0.11
0.16
0.16
Note: OLS regressions used for donation amounts, and logistic regression used for
participation; standard errors in parentheses. The price variable is ordered from high
to low.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
In Experiment 1, we begin to find some evidence that agency effects participation,
but not the conditional giving amount. In other words, those who were given more
agency were more likely to make some form of donation, but they did not make higher
donations than the control donors. A lower price of giving does lead to higher giving

17

amounts among those who give, but from Table 2 we see that only the lowest price of
giving induces a significantly higher percentage of participants to make some form of
donation. These initial findings contradict those of Eckel, Herberich and Meer’s (2014),
who found that giving people more choice in directing a donation did not lead to
increased likelihood of participation, but did lead to larger donations. In order to further
investigate these relationships, we test another treatment intended to evoke an even
greater sense of agency. Our initial evidence suggests there is no interaction between
agency and price but is not conclusive.
Experiment 2 – Text entry box
In the second experiment, the control condition was the same as Experiment 1.
The control participants had no choice of what charity to give to, but they were randomly
assigned a charity from the same list of ten used in the previous experiment.
Agency treatment: Text entry box
The agency treatment in this experiment allowed participants to write in their own
charity. They were given a text entry box, in which they could type the name of any
charity they like. This treatment was designed to augment the ability of the donors to
choose “where” they give, a manipulation meant to allow greater alignment of values,
which would be expected to result in higher donations. To reinforce their choice of
charity, once they typed the name of their charity into the text entry box and clicked the
button to move to the next screen, the name of their charity appeared in the following
question, that asked how much they would be willing to give to that charity (see
Appendix E).
Results
Experiment 2 yielded even stronger results in the manipulation check, with the
difference in the perceived agency for where to donate even more pronounced. Those
with a text entry box agreed more strongly that they had control over where to donate, on
a 5 point Likert scale where 1 is “strongly disagree” and 5 is “strongly agree”, (M = 4.70,
SD = .86) compared with the control group (M = 1.86, SD = 1.43), t (405) = 24.28, p <
.001 (see Table 4). As before, the difference in means for the second item of the
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manipulation check, the perceived control over donation amount, was small and not
statistically significant.
From Experiment 2, we report similar findings as those from the Experiment 1.
Table 4 presents the results series of t-tests comparing our agency treatment to the control
condition Those with the agency treatment, using a text entry box to write in the name of
a charity, gave significantly higher unconditional average donations (M = $5.45, SD =
3.88) than those in the control condition (M = $3.97, SD = 3.92), a difference in means of
$1.48, t (406) = 3.84, p = .0001 (see Table 4). This agency treatment, allowing people to
write in their own charity, had an overall effect size of Cohen’s d = 0.38. When we look
at the components of this effect, by analyzing the participation rates and conditional
average donations, we found that an increase in agency led to higher participation rates,
but not to significantly higher donation amounts among those who gave. Again, agency
led more people to give, but not to give more.
Table 4. Experiment 2 Giving Outcomes by Agency Condition

Agency
Condition:
Control
Condition (no
choice)

Perceived
Agency
(where to
donate)

Unconditional Participation
Average
Rate
Donation

Conditional
Average
Donation

1.86

$3.97

67.6%

$5.88

(1.43)

(3.92)

(.47)

(3.28)

4.70

$5.45

84.4%

$6.45

(0.86)

(3.89)

(.36)

(3.34)

2.84 ***

$1.48 ***

16.7% ***

$0.58

n=202
Agency
Treatment (open
text box)
n=205
Difference:

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
As mentioned earlier, we detected significantly higher rates of religious
attendance in the control group, while testing the randomization process with covariates.
This discrepancy only strengthens our finding an increase in participation among the
agency treatment group, as the higher religious attendance would indicate a greater
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willingness to donate among the control group. We will discuss this further in the next
section that compares both experiments.
Looking at the price effects in Experiment 2, we again found that decreases in the
price of giving yielded higher donation amounts (see Table 5). This time, however, the
price reductions also correlated with significant increases in participation at both the
$0.50 and $0.20 prices of giving. This is a more pronounced effect on participation than
that of Experiment 1, where we found increased participation only in the $0.20 price
group. This suggests that with a higher level of agency, price may also induce higher
participation. We again tested an interaction term using logistic and linear regressions,
but found no evidence of a significant interaction between agency and price (see Table
6). Agency and price both affect charitable giving in different ways, and don’t seem to
interact with each other.
Table 5. Experiment 2 Giving Outcomes by Price Variations
Unconditional Participation
Conditional
Average
Rate
Average Donation
Price of giving:
Donation
1$ (control)

$2.66

61.8%

$4.30

n=102

(3.06)

(.49)

(2.83)

$0.80

$4.05

71.6%

$5.66

n=102

(3.77)

(.45)

(3.28)

$1.39 **

9.8%

$1.36 **

$0.50

$5.05

83.3%

$6.06

n=103

(3.80)

(.37)

(3.33)

$2.39 ***

21.6% ***

$1.76 ***

$0.20

$7.09

87.3%

$8.12

n=99

(3.87)

(.34)

(2.95)

$4.43 ***

25.5% ***

$3.82 ***

Difference from
control:

Difference from
control:

Difference from
control:

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 6. Regressions of Giving Outcomes, Testing Interaction of Price and Agency
Unconditional
Conditional
Donations (Including
Participation
Donations
$0)
(Excluding $0)
odds
odds
b/se
b/se
ratio /se ratio /se b/se
b/se
Treatment
(open text
Box)
Price
(high to low)
Religious
attendance

1.549***

1.281

2.884***

1.795

0.69

1.205

(-0.353)
1.437***
(-0.158)

(-0.863)
1.275*
(-0.5)

(0.732)
1.692***
(0.194)

(1.018)
1.248
(0.432)

-0.359
1.220***
(-0.161)

-0.939
1.528**
(-0.542)

0.062
(-0.15)

0.064
(-0.15)

1.150
(0.126)

1.153
(0.127)

-0.06
(-0.149)

-0.061
(-0.149)

0.209
(-0.539)
407
0.2

0.107
(-0.315)
0.342
(-0.666)
407
0.2

0.449
(0.161)
407

1.252
(0.305)
0.536
(0.218)
407

2.683***
(-0.588)
309
0.17

-0.194
(-0.326)
2.379**
(-0.78)
309
0.17

Treatment x
Price
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Adjusted Rsquared
0.2
0.19
0.16
0.16
Note: OLS regressions used for unconditional and conditional donations and logistic
regression used for participation. Religious attendance entered as a control variable.
Standard errors in parentheses. The price variable is ordered from high to low.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Comparison of Experiments 1 and 2
A comparison of the two experiments strengthens the evidence for more agency
increasing donative behavior. Figure 1 presents a bar chart with the levels of perceived
agency and the unconditional average donations, between the treatment and control
groups in both experiments. Comparing the treatment groups from both experiments, we
found that the open text box resulted in significantly higher perceived agency than the
drop-down list (Mtext box = 4.70, SD = 0.86 vs. Mdrop-down = 4.45, SD = 1.01), t (408) = 2.68, p < .01). These changes in agency resulted in higher participation rates in both
experiments, but not in average donation amounts among those who did give. This rise in
the number of participants willing to donate something led to significantly higher giving
overall. The unconditional average donation in Experiment 2 among the treatment group
(M = $5.45, SD = 3.88) was significantly higher than the unconditional average donations
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of the treatment group in Experiment 1 (M = $3.78, SD = 3.70), t (408) = -4.46, p < .001.
This supports the notion that an increase in the agency of donors leads to higher
donations overall.
Figure 1. Perceived Agency and Average Donations in Agency Treatment and

0

2

4

6

Control Groups in both Experiments.

Control

Drop-down List

Experiment 1
Perceived Agency

Control

Open Text Box

Experiment 2
Average Donation

Note: The control group in Experiment 2 had significantly higher rates of religious
attendance, which helps to explain the higher average donation than the control
group in Experiment 1.
Other factors may account for the differences in donations between the two
experiments. In Figure 1, we see that the control group in Experiment 2 has higher
donations than the treatment group in Experiment 1. This is the group that had the
significantly higher rates of religious attendance, which may explain some of the
difference. There may be other covariates that account for the difference that we did not
capture. Moreover, the experiments were conducted several weeks apart, and at different
times of the day, which may account for undetected fixed effects. Comparing the two
experiments provides initial evidence that increasing perceived agency among potential
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donors leads to higher participation, and thus higher total donations. The comparison also
suggests that certain mechanisms are more effective in increasing perceived agency.
Discussion and Conclusions
Much has been written on the price of giving. Testing the price of giving has been
conducted in laboratory experiments, but only a few have used giving to actual charitable
organizations (c.f. Berman and Small, 2012; Eckel & Grossman, 2003). Our study uses
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to test charitable giving scenarios to actual charitable
organizations, in a controlled experiment. Although much has been written about MTurk
workers and the types of sample populations one can get by using MTurk (Paolacci,
Chandler and Ipeirotis, 2010), little is known about their donative behavior. We know
that MTurk participants are motivated by making money (Sheehan and Pittman, 2016),
but it is unclear how strong the profit motive is, and if it would override any charitable
inclinations. Our experiments show that U.S.-based MTurk participants are willing to
donate to charity at the sacrifice of their own bonus money. This study opens the doors
for further research on charitable giving using MTurk as a platform.
The importance of agency in charitable giving is not well understood. The agency
treatment used in the experiments were very simple mechanisms used to test the theory
that increase agency leads to increased donations. We found significant increases in
participation rates and overall donations, although not the average gift amounts. This
could have immediate implications for professional fundraisers. Finding ways to increase
the agency of donors, such as allowing donors more say in where a donation is directed
could lead to significantly higher contributions to nonprofits. For example, United Way
gave donors more choice of where to direct their donation to increase their participation
in corporate campaigns. The open text box mechanism is easily employed in online
settings, and could be used in a variety of ways to increase perceived agency. More
research translating experimental findings to application in the field is needed. Agency is
a complex psychological construct. Some aspects of agency, such as freedom to pick
one’s recipient, yielded higher donations than other forms, such as picking from a list.
Agency also has its limits, where too many choices can lead to diminished consumer
responses (Simonson & Tversky, 1992). More research on the types and bounds of
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agency involved in charitable giving will help identify the most effective types of agency
mechanisms.
Kessler, Milkman, and Zhang (2017) found that a greater sense of agency had a
more significant effect on the the wealthy and powerful, than on other donors. The use of
MTurk limited our sample to participants with relatively lower income. Agency may
have varying effects across other dimensions of social and economic demographics. We
did not find a significant interaction between agency and price. However, our samples
may have been too small to detect a true interaction. Our findings also contradicted in
some ways the findings of Eckel, Herberich and Meer (2014). We found that agency
increased participation but not giving amounts, while they found the inverse relationship.
More research will have to be done to better understand the contexts in which agency
effects the various aspects of the donation decision making process.
Our findings on price effects are not surprising, but our study makes two
significant contributions to the literature. First, we found that price primarily affected the
conditional donation amounts, but only the lowest prices affected the participations rates.
This distinction may have implications in research designed to estimate tax effects on
charitable giving. Furthermore, such price effects will have to be tested with other
mechanisms for manipulating price, such as matching gift programs. Second, price did
not interact with agency. While this may easily be overlooked as a failure to reject the
null hypothesis, there are some potential theoretical implications. Is it possible that donor
process varying motivations separately and distinctly from each other. The M-Turk
donors in this study seemed to process the price variations completely separately from the
agency treatments. Fundraising appeals often combine a variety of elements designed to
attract donors, with little consideration to how the relate or don’t relate to each other.
Suppose that an agency treatment were employed first to increase participation, and then
a price variation were employed to increase average donation amounts. Then these two
separate mechanisms may be used more effectively. Knowing the distinct effects of
various factors in giving is important to future research in charitable giving. Being able
to segment out the psychological processes of charitable giving will allow researchers to
more carefully study this challenging human behavior.
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APPENDIX A. CHOICE SETS IN THE VARIOUS PRICE OF GIVING
CONDITIONS
Choice set for $1 price of giving
Your donation
to [Charity]:

$0

$1

$2

$3

$4

$5

$6

$7

$8

$9

$10

Your potential
bonus:

$10

$9

$8

$7

$6

$5

$4

$3

$2

$1

$0

$5

$6

Choice set for $0.80 price of giving
Your
donation
to
[Charity]:

$0

$1

$2

$3

$4

Your
potential
bonus:

$10

$9.20

$8.40

$7.60

$6.80

$6 $5.20

$7

$8

$9

$10

$4.40

$3.60

$2.80

$2

Choice set for $0.50 price of giving
Your
donation to
[Charity]:

$0

$1

$2

$3

$4

$5

$6

$7

$8

$9

$10

Your
potential
bonus:

$10

$9.50

$9

$8.50

$8

$7.50

$7

$6.50

$6

$5.50

$5

Choice set for $0.20 price of giving
Your
donation to
[Charity]:

$0

$1

$2

$3

$4

$5

$6

$7

$8

$9

$10

Your
potential
bonus:

$10

$9.80

$9.60

$9.40

$9.20

$9

$8.80

$8.60

$8.40

$8.20

$8
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APPENDIX B. CONTROL CONDITION IN AGENCY AND PRICE
EXPERIMENTS.
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APPENDIX C. AGENCY TREATMENT IN EXPERIMENT 1 – DROP-DOWN
LIST
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APPENDIX D. EXPERIMENT 1: PARTICIPATION RATES AND MEAN
DONATIONS BY PRICE AND AGENCY
Average donation amount ($
US)

Participation rate
(s.d), n
Agency /
Price of Giving
$1.00

Control

Agency

Group

Treatment

.59

.59

(.50),
n=51

(.50),
n=51

.49

.64

(.50),
n=51

(.48),
n=50

Difference:

-.10

.05

$0.50

.48

.78

(.50),
n=52

(.42),
n=52

-.11

$0.80

(s.d.), n
Diff.:

Control

Agency

Group

Treatment

3.60

3.77

(2.58),
n=30

(2.01),
n=30

5.08

4.34

(3.35),
n=25

(3.26),
n=32

1.48 *

0.57

5.32

5.43

(3.42),
n=25

(3.42),
n=40

.20 *

1.72 *

1.66 *

.75

.76

7.00

7.64

(.43),
n=48

(.43),
n=51

(3.28),
n=36

(2.71),
n=39

.16 *

.18 *

3.40 ***

3.87 ***

0

.15

.30
***

Diff.:

0.16

-0.74

0.11

Difference
(from $1):
$0.20

Difference
(from $1):

.01

0.64

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. P-values from t-tests of differences in means
are as follows: * for p<.05, ** for p<.01, *** for p<.001
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APPENDIX E. AGENCY TREATMENT IN EXPERIMENT 2 – TEXT ENTRY BOX
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APPENDIX F. MEAN SCORES ON MANIPULATION CHECK ITEMS:
Experiment 1

Likert scale responses: (1= Strongly Control
Agree, 5 = Strongly disagree)
“I was able to choose where I would
donate”
“I was able to choose how much I would
donate”
“I had complete control over my donation
decision.”

Treatment

2.07

4.45

(1.63)

(1.01)

1.41

1.39

(1.00)

(0.93)

4.10

4.59

(1.12)

(0.95)

Difference

2.38***

0.02

0.49***

Experiment 2
Control
“I was able to choose where I would
donate”
“I was able to choose how much I would
donate”
“I had complete control over my donation
decision.”

Treatment

1.86

4.70

(1.43)

(0.86)

1.34

1.32

(0.82)

(0.85)

3.92

4.61

(1.26)

(0.91)

Difference
2.84***

0.02

0.69***

P-values from t-tests of differences in means are as follows: * for p<.05, ** for p<.01,
*** for p<.001
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Abstract

Donor-advised funds (DAFs) are becoming increasingly popular. DAFs receive a
growing share of all charitable donations and control a sizable proportion of grants made
to other nonprofits. The growth of DAFs has generated controversy over their function as
intermediary philanthropic vehicles. Using a panel data set of 996 DAF organizations
from 2007 to 2016, this article provides an empirical analysis of DAF activity. We
conduct longitudinal analyses of key DAF metrics, such as grants and payout rates. We
find that a few large organizations heavily skew the aggregated data for a rather
heterogeneous group of nonprofits. These panel data are then analyzed with
macroeconomic indicators to analyze changes in DAF metrics during economic
recessions. We find that, in general, DAF grantmaking is relatively resilient to recessions.
We also find payout rates increased during times of recession, as did a new variable we
call the flow rate.
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Introduction
The growth of donor-advised funds (DAFs) demands more attention from
researchers. With tens of thousands of new donor-advised fund accounts established
every year, they have been called “the fastest-growing vehicle in philanthropy” (National
Philanthropic Trust, 2017). In 2016, DAFs accounted for 10% of charitable donations by
individuals (Andreoni, 2017). That same year, Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund, a donoradvised fund sponsor, surpassed the United Way as the top nonprofit in donations
received (Lindsay, Olson-Phillips, & Stiffman, 2016; National Philanthropic Trust,
2017). Every year, donor-advised funds facilitate hundreds of thousands of people
making billions of dollars of transfers to the nonprofit sector. This article analyzes a
comprehensive data set to better understand the flow of money through donor-advised
funds as intermediary philanthropic organizations.
We begin by overviewing the fundamental DAF activities and the different
types of sponsor organizations. We briefly review issues regarding donor-advised
funds that are salient to public policy debate. We then present our data and our
analyses with two specific aims: 1. Analyze how donor-advised fund grantmaking
relates to other metrics; and 2. Explain how DAF activities relate to economic
conditions. Using a panel data set of nearly one thousand donor-advised fund
organizations from 2007-2016, we offer empirical analyses of grants, payout rates,
and a new metric called flow rate. Merging this panel data with macroeconomic
indicators, we then explore how DAF activity changes during recession conditions.
We discover important correlations between DAF activity and economic conditions
that will be useful for policy considerations. While other forms of charitable giving
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generally drop during economic downturns, we find that grants from DAFs remain
relatively stable in recession conditions, despite reduction in contributions and
decline in assets. This contributes to an increase in payout rates and flow rates during
recessions. Given these findings, donor-advised funds may be an important resource
to the nonprofit economy in future recessions.
Overview
Donor-advised funds are intermediary philanthropic vehicles. They function as
personal giving accounts, like checking or savings accounts that are designated
irrevocably for charitable giving. There are three basic activities that occur in the use of
donor-advised funds (see Figure 1). First, a person contributes money, or other assets,
into a donor-advised fund account. The account is held by a 501(c)(3) nonprofit
organization, known as a donor-advised fund sponsor, so the contribution into the
account is considered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to be a tax-deductible
donation. Second, the nonprofit organization manages the assets in the account for a fee.
Third, the donor advises the sponsor to make grants out of the donor-advised fund
account to recipient public charities.
[Figure 1. here]
Donor-advised fund sponsors can be grouped into three categories: community
foundations, single-issue charities, and national sponsor organizations (National
Philanthropic Trust, 2017). Community foundations were the original sponsors of donoradvised funds. They are the most common type (60% of all DAF sponsors) and usually
attract donors within a specific geographic region. Single-issue charities host donoradvised funds as a way to attract and retain donors for a certain cause, such as religion or
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education. National sponsor organizations (NSOs) are typically subsidiary nonprofits to
financial services providers such as Fidelity, Vanguard, or Schwab. There were only 46
NSO entities that reported to the IRS in 2015 (5% of all DAF sponsors), but these
relatively few organizations controlled about half (49%) of all assets under management
in donor-advised funds.

Donor-advised Fund Issues
There are many reasons why people use donor-advised funds. They offer low
cost, easy-to-use solutions for conducting charitable giving. However, the proliferation of
donor-advised funds has sparked public policy debates around several issues (Daniels,
2015). This section explains some of the main issues that donor-advised fund reform
advocates raise. This review gives context to our analyses on grantmaking and DAF
activity. However, the purpose of our analyses is not to respond to the debates, but rather
to provide insightful empirical evidence to inform policy discussions.
Donor-Advised Fund Growth
What makes donor-advised funds an important topic to study is the sheer scope of
their growth in recent years (Dagher, 2017). Daniels and Lindsay (2017) have aptly
described the expansion of donor-advised fund usage as “reshaping the philanthropy
landscape” (p. 26). In their annual report on donor-advised funds, National Philanthropic
Trust (2018) reported that in the fiscal year 2017, the total assets under management by
donor-advised funds reached over $110 B (an increase of 27.3% over the previous year),
and a total of 463,622 individual accounts (an increase of 60.2%). In comparison to the
82,516 private foundations that control about $856 B in assets, donor-advised funds
represent a significant market share of nonprofit assets. In the same year, DAFs granted

39

$19.08 B, roughly 40% of the $49.5 B granted by private foundations (National
Philanthropic Trust, 2018). One caveat to this statistic is that DAFs are able to make
grants to other DAFs. In a special report on donor-advised funds, Giving USA (2018)
reported: “From 2012 to 2015, DAF-to-DAF granting accounted for 4.4 percent of all
dollars from donor-advised fund grants” (p. 29). On all measures, assets, number of users,
grants distributed, and contributions received, donor-advised funds have experienced
prolific growth, which raises the importance of understanding them more fully.
Timing of the Tax Deduction
Perhaps the most attractive feature of donor-advised funds is also the most
controversial. Donors claim a tax deduction in the year that they contribute to the DAF,
without needing to decide where the money will be distributed. Rooney (2017) notes that
this separation in timing makes it easier for donors to make major giving decisions and
allows donors to maximize tax benefits during periods of income fluctuation. There is no
legal requirement for money placed in a donor-advised fund to be used within a certain
timeframe; it is possible that the money could sit in the account indefinitely. Madoff
(2016a) questioned the current legal treatment of donor-advised funds, and argued that
donors should not get a publicly subsidized tax-deduction until their donation is in the
hands of an organization that will use it to create public goods.
Tax Advantages
The immediate deduction and other tax treatments of donor-advised funds allow
their users several tax advantages. Contributions of appreciated assets into donor-advised
funds avoid capital gains taxes and receive a deduction for the fair market value of the
asset (such donations to private foundations do not receive a deduction for the full fair-
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market value). Moreover, donor-advised funds can be used to bunch charitable donations
that normally would be made over a period of years. Andreoni (2017) explained how
using a donor-advised fund to front-load charitable giving into a single year maximizes
tax advantages. There is some evidence that the recent increase in the standard deduction
prompted a spike in contributions to donor-advised funds at the end of 2017 (Rubin,
2018). These tax advantages are a driving motivation for the use of DAFs, but also cost
the federal government through the loss of tax revenue, and some suggest that such tax
advantages benefit primarily the wealthy (The Economist, 2018). Andreoni (2017)
explained that from a public policy standpoint, net societal benefit of DAFs would only
be worth the cost if they generated more charitable giving to compensate for losses in tax
revenue. Many argue that such tax advantages should not be offered without a guarantee
for when and how the money will be used for charitable purposes (Gelles, 2018; Hussey,
2010; Madoff, 2016b).
Regulation
The timing of the tax deduction has led to policy suggestions around payout rates
and time limits on donor-advised funds. Madoff (2016a) suggested requiring DAF
accounts to meet a minimum payout rate, like private foundations. Generally, the
organization-level payout rates of DAF sponsors well exceed the 5% minimum imposed
on private foundations, as will be shown later in this paper. However, payout rates of
individual accounts within a DAF sponsor may range widely. In 2014, David Camp of
the House Ways and Committee, proposed to tax individual donor-advised fund accounts
if the money had not been allocated within five years (Colinvaux, 2017; Daniels, 2015).
At the organization-level, Andreoni (2017) found that the “shelf-life” of money is
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between 3 to 4 years. Both the minimum payout rate and time limit for DAF accounts are
attempts to bring more assurance that money going into donor-advised funds will be used
in a timely manner for public purposes. Other possible regulations involve more
accountability, regulation of grants, or different tax treatments for contributions into
DAFs (Colinvaux, 2017).
Available Data
The biggest limitation to the study of donor-advised funds is the availability of
data. Brostek’s (2006) Government Accountability Office report offered summary
statistics and requested that more data be collected on DAFs by the IRS. The Pension
Protection Act of 2006 began to require DAF sponsors to report specific information on
their annual Form 990. Since then, the Treasury Department (McMahon, 2011),
Congressional Research Services (Sherlock & Gravelle, 2012) and the IRS (Arnsberger,
2012, 2016) have produced reports that used this 990 data to analyze DAF trends over
time. These reports provide summary statistics on aggregated IRS data, and some
bivariate analysis with little or no inferential statistics. In 2016, the IRS was mandated to
release machine-readable data from electronic filings of 990s (Orsen-Phillips, 2016;
Perry, 2015), however not all DAF sponsors file electronically and the data format still
requires extensive manual work.
Starting in 2006, National Philanthropic Trust (NPT), which is itself a DAF
sponsor, began compiling 990 data made publicly available by the IRS. NPT has used
this compiled dataset to produce an annual report on donor-advised funds (National
Philanthropic Trust, 2017). The NPT report is often cited by other articles as a primary
source of donor-advised fund statistics (c.f. Andreoni, 2017; Colinvaux, 2017; Madoff,
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2014; Rooney, 2017). The Chronicle of Philanthropy, has collected its own primary data
by conducting annual surveys of 105 of the largest donor-advised fund sponsors since
1999. This data is useful because it has information not collected by the Form 990, such
as administrative fees, and because it predates 2006, when all DAF sponsors began
reporting to the IRS. Giving USA (2018) produced a special report on donor-advised
funds, using IRS Statistics of Income microdata. Other primary data come from annual
reports produced by DAF sponsors themselves, such as Fidelity Charitable (2017) and
National Christian Foundation (2017). What is needed is a deeper analysis of donoradvised fund activity, to better understand trends and behaviors within this subset of
nonprofits.
Data for this Study
The data we use allow us to investigate DAFs with more granular analyses than
previous empirical work. They have been collected on discrete DAF sponsor
organizations and, therefore, can better reveal some of the complexities of donor-advised
funds. Beginning in 2006, all donor-advised fund sponsors report four relevant pieces of
data: 1) the total number of accounts managed by the DAF sponsor, 2) the total value of
contributions collected, 3) the total year-end value of assets, and 4) the total value of
grants made. These variables are reported by each sponsor organization as aggregated
totals; they are not individual, account-level data. The four variables are reported
annually on the Form 990, Schedule D and eventually made public. The panel data used
in this study includes 996 donor-advised sponsors for years 2007-2016. Our data set also
includes the Employer Identification Number (EIN), name of the organization, the month
of the organization’s fiscal year end, and sponsor type: community foundation, single-
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issue charity, or national sponsor. In Table 1, we present the summary statistics for our
panel data, including the sum, mean, and median values for each of the four key
variables.
[Table 1 here]
Data completeness
Because our research aims to understand variation among DAF sponsors, we must
carefully define the study population and ensure that we have captured all relevant
organizations. The 996 donor-advised fund sponsors in our panel include all DAF
sponsors with substantive activity. By comparison, the IRS reported a total of 2,121 DAF
sponsors in tax year 2012, which were all nonprofits that returned a Schedule D in their
990 (Arnsberger, 2016). The total reported by the IRS fails to account for the fact that
many exempt organizations erroneously submit a Schedule D when they do not actually
operate donor-advised fund accounts and that many small DAF sponsors have little to no
activity. While our panel has fewer than half of the organizations claiming to operate
DAFs, it represents almost the entirety of DAF assets reported by the IRS2.
Using the IRS Form 990 data on donor-advised funds also requires careful
handling of missing data. Missing data problems take three forms: erroneous information,
slow reporting, and inconsistent reporting by some organizations in the panel. Some
missing data result from poor accounting practices, including submitting when not active,
placing information in the wrong fields, and submitting erroneous values. We drop any
observation with missing data on all four key variables from all of our analyses. We also
drop any variables that include clearly erroneous data (e.g. negative payout rates) in
analyses of those values. Another issue is the timing of when the data is made available,
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which can take several years in some cases. We are missing about 80% of the data for
year 2016 because it had not yet been released by the IRS when we collected the data.
Therefore, we do not include that year in most of the analyses. Finally, to account for
inconsistent reporting, as well as emerging and discontinued DAFs, we create a balanced
panel. We conduct most analyses with both the full panel and the balanced panel. We
present the balanced panel for longitudinal analyses to eliminate organizations that may
have inconsistent accounting, and to ensure that our results are not due to different panel
assemblies between years. We use the full set of observations in regressions and other
analyses when we do not find a significant difference between the balanced and full
panels.
Skewness
One of the unique contributions of this paper is to highlight the skewness of the
data behind aggregated DAF statistics. This skewness can be clearly seen in Table 1 by
looking at the means and medians in the summary statistics. For example, in 2015, the
total value of assets in donor-advised funds was $74.0 billion. The mean was $83 million,
but this represents roughly the 85th percentile of the distribution; the median DAF only
held about $5.6 million in assets. The single largest DAF sponsor, Fidelity Charitable,
held $15.2 billion (21% of the total sum). The ten largest DAFs (top 1.1% of the
distribution) held $43 billion (58% of the total sum). Two problems result from the
skewness in the data. First, any patterns in the aggregated statistics will be due to a few
large organizations. To more accurately represent DAF activity in our analyses, we report
the statistics for the median organizations whenever possible. Second, highly skewed data
pose challenges for regression analyses. The outliers unduly leverage any regression line
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being fit to the rest of the data, and the standard errors of the residuals in regressions are
not normally distributed. To mitigate these challenges, we use log transformations or
inverse hyperbolic sine transformations of the variables in most of our regression
analyses.
Most DAF analyses in both academic and practitioner literatures use the
aggregated national totals. Using aggregated statistics to calculate mean averages with
DAF data can be misleading. For example, the average account size of donor-advised
funds in 2015 was $278,458, and the average contribution into DAFs was $77,330, when
calculated using aggregated sums. Looking at all DAF organizations in our sample for
2015, the range of average account sizes was $251 to $74.4 million and the median was
$137,923 (half of the average value calculated with aggregated statistics). In 2015, the
range of average contributions by organization was $3 to $254 million and the median
value was $21,238 (only 27% of the average calculated with aggregated statistics). Using
aggregated data, Andreoni (2017) estimated the income of the average DAF user to be
between $1.4 and 2.2 million, which provided evidence for the claim that DAFs are used
predominantly by the very wealthy. Using organization-level data leads to a substantially
different understanding of the typical DAF user. Understanding the skewness of data
allows researchers and others to more carefully interpret aggregated DAF statistics.
Methods and Findings
We approach our analyses of donor-advised funds in an exploratory manner. We
identify grants as the key variable of interest because understanding DAF granting seems
to be at the crux of much of the public policy debate. First, we analyze the relationship
between grants and other DAF variables. We then examine the ratios of grants to assets,
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known as payout rates, as well as the ratio of grants to contributions, a new metric we call
flow rate. Lastly, we explore how these key DAF metrics relate to macroeconomic
indicators.
Grants, Payout Rates, and Flow Rates
In 2015, over $13.5 billion was granted to public charities out of DAFs. Sponsor
grant totals ranged from $0 to $2.8 billion, with a mean of $15.5 million and a median of
$750,000. Out of 897 observations for that year, only 5 sponsors (less than 1% of the
population) reported $0 in grants. In the absence of immediate economic incentives, such
as tax deductions, what factors explain this outflow of money from DAFs to other
nonprofits? To understand grants coming out of DAFs, we begin by analyzing the
relationships between grants and the other DAF variables. Figure 2 shows scatter plots of
grants with the other three variables. There are generally strong and positive correlations
between the value of grants coming out of DAFs and the value of assets, contributions
into DAFs, and number of accounts. This is unsurprising. Using organization-level data,
as the size of an organization increases, so should its activity.
[Figure 2 Here]
To further explore these relationships, we turn to regression analyses of grants
and related ratios. Grants, contributions, and assets, like many monetary variables, are
highly skewed. However, a log transformation does not allow for zero values, which are
present in our data. Therefore, we perform an inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS)
transformation to correct for skewness. The IHS transformation is preferred to a log
transformation when the skewed variable also includes zeros, because the IHS
transformation allows for zero and negative values (Burbidge et al. 1988, MacKinnon and
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Magee 1990, Pence 2006). The IHS transformation is interpreted similarly to a log-log
transformation.
Grants
To understand the variation in grant amounts, we run a regression of grants on the
other DAF variables – contributions, assets, and number of accounts. Table 2, models 1
through 3, show that each of the other DAF variables correlates positively and
significantly with grants, as was observed in the scatter plots in Figure 2. Model 4 shows
these variables entered into the same model. Each still significantly explains a portion of
the variance in grants. Model 5 controls for year fixed effects, to account for any major
events that may cause changes in grant-making and other DAF variables for all
organizations in a particular year. Model 5 shows that, holding other DAF variables
constant, a one percent increase in assets yields a 0.41 percent increase in grants; a one
percent increase in contributions into DAFs yields a 0.35 percent increase in grants out of
DAFs; and a one percent increase in the number of accounts yields a 0.39 percent
increase in grants. These simple findings suggest that grants coming out of DAFs are not
based solely on the amount of assets in the DAF. Other variables, such as the
contributions coming into the DAFs within the same year, also explain the amount of
grants going out that year.
[Table 2 Here]
Payout Rate
As discussed above, a common statistic used to describe donor-advised fund
behavior is the ratio between grants and the asset value – known as the payout rate. The
payout rate concept is derived from policies regulating private foundations. How this
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ratio is best calculated for donor-advised funds, and what it means in the donor-advised
fund context, has been a matter of some debate (Daniels & Lindsay, 2016b; Madoff,
2014). While the National Philanthropic Trust (2017) uses the same method for
calculating payout rate as is used by foundations3, Arnsberger (2016) provided a formula
that indirectly accounts for investment earnings and fees in the calculation of asset value,
uses data from within the same reporting year4, and generally yields slightly lower rates.
It will be used for the analyses in this article, because it mitigates problems with missing
data between years.
In 2015, a relatively representative year, the median payout rate by DAFs was
13%, which has remained fairly flat between 2007 and 2015. Out of 849 observations in
2015, 156 (18% of the sponsors) had payout rates of 5% or less, giving us an indication
of the minority that grant the same or less than the minimum for private foundations.
Table 3 depicts the generally flat trend of payout rates, which indicates that grant values
grow at roughly the same rate as asset values. The exception to the flat payout rates in
this period is in 2008, when the median payout rate reached 16%. Because 2008 was the
beginning of an economic recession in the United States, the increase in payout rate
indicates that further examination of DAF use during recessions is warranted.
[Table 3. Here]
Flow Rate
While payout rate is a useful measure of DAF activity, it only measures the
relationship of grants to assets, and we know from our regression analyses that grants
also correlate with contributions. Holding assets constant, grants still change when
contributions change. In other words, the amount of grantmaking from a DAF sponsor is
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explained in part by the amount of money coming into a DAF sponsor within the same
year. This finding means that we cannot think of DAFs as operating like private
foundations, where the grantmaking is based almost completely on the level of assets. We
must think of DAFs as a different type of intermediary philanthropic organization.
To understand DAF operations, we must use measures that capture not only
grantmaking in relation to assets but also grantmaking in relation to contributions. DAF
account holders often contribute funds to established DAF accounts, and this activity is
not captured well by a payout rate. Using an individual example, suppose a donor
transfers $10,000 of securities into a DAF account that began the year with $2,000, and
then grants $9,000 out to various charities that same year. Assuming no interest or fees,
according to the formula above, the payout rate would be $9,000 divided by $2,000, or
450%. This measure is not a good indicator of how this donor-advised fund was used.
Another way to look at the same DAF activity would be to consider that a donor
contributed $10,000 into a DAF account and granted out 90% within the same year. The
ratio of grants to contributions gauges an important aspect of DAF usage that is not
measured by payout rate. We call this measure the flow rate and use it at the organization
level to assess the volume of grant money leaving DAF coiffeurs in relation to the
volume of DAF money entering DAF coiffeurs within the same year.
If donor-advised fund sponsors were likened to a reservoir, the flow rate would
measure the amount of water released by the reservoir as a percentage of the amount of
water coming into the reservoir. This gives us a sense of the rate at which water is
flowing through a reservoir. Just as water flowing into a reservoir is not necessarily the
same water that is flowing out, we are unable to distinguish whether the money being
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granted from donor-advised funds is the same money as that which is being contributed
within a given year. Without individual account-level data, it is impossible to use this
statistic to measure how individuals are using their accounts. If a DAF sponsor has a 90%
flow rate, the grants may be coming out of different accounts than those receiving
contributions, but we still get a sense, at the organization level, of the rate at which
money is coming and going.
Recent articles and reports about donor-advised funds have begun to use other
measures of how money is flowing in and out of DAFs, to get a more complete picture of
DAF usage. Fidelity Charitable claimed that “three-quarters of donor contribution dollars
are granted within 5 years” (Fidelity Charitable, 2017). Andreoni’s (2017) “shelf-life” of
donor-advised fund money estimates that contributions into DAFs for a given year will
be spent, after all previous moneys are spent, within 3 to 4 years. The flow rate variable is
limited in its ability to describe all DAF activity, but it gives an additional perspective to
the common measure of payout rates and is helpful in understanding how DAFs function.
The median flow rate in 2015 was 87%. This means that for the median DAF
sponsor, the value of the grants given out of the organization was 87% of the value of the
contributions that were made into the organization in that year. It also suggests that about
13% of the value of contributions is remaining in the organization to be used in the
future. The median for this statistic has remained fairly flat over the time period of the
data, except for the year 2009, when it peaked at 103% (see Table 3). This means that in
2009 the median DAF sponsor gave away more money than it received – another
indication that DAF activity is different during a recession.
Differences Across DAF Categories
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DAFs in the United States range from large national sponsors to small singleissue charities. It is possible that different types and sizes of DAFs behave differently.
This section of the analysis looks at how the type and size of DAFs relate to the metrics
of grants, payout rates, and flow rates. These relationships are important for policy
makers, as legislation may have distinctive consequences on different types and sizes of
DAFs.
Type
There are three types of donor-advised fund sponsors: community foundations,
single-issue charities, and national sponsors. We explored how DAF metrics differ by
sponsor type by regressing grants on the other DAF variables separately for each sponsor
type (Table 4). We found differing coefficients for each explanatory variable (assets,
contributions, and number of accounts). We find that an increase in National sponsor
assets is not associated with a significant increase in grants. Contributions and number of
accounts do significantly explain differences in granting from National sponsors. This is
in contrast with community foundations and single-issue charities where increases in all
three variables are significantly associated with increases in grants. These findings, taken
together, suggest that national sponsors are not as reliant on or responsive to asset levels
when making grants. Granting from community foundation DAFs and single-issue DAFs
is more affected by asset levels, after controlling for contributions and number of
accounts, suggesting that there may be more of an emphasis on preserving an asset base
among these sponsors or the donors they work with.
[Table 4 here]
Size
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Not all donor-advised funds are the same size. Some sponsors are extremely large,
but the vast majority are relatively moderate or small. To analyze how the relationship
between grants and other DAF variables differs by size, we categorized DAF sponsors
into three categories: small, medium, and large. We used the median asset value in 2014
($5.56 million) to differentiate the small and medium DAF organizations. We chose
2014’s median because we have the most complete data for that year. We defined the
largest DAF sponsors as those with assets over $1 billion. This group can be thought of
as outliers. It has very few organizations (less than 1% of all observations) but has the
potential to influence relationships in the regression analyses.
When we regressed grants on other DAF variables separately by size category
(see Table 5), we found that each size group has different relationships between the
explanatory factors (assets, contributions, or number of accounts) and grants. We found
that larger DAF sponsors are significantly more responsive to changes in contributions
than changes in assets. The large sponsors behave similarly to the national sponsors,
because most (but not all) of the large sponsors are national sponsors. Medium sponsors’
grants respond significantly more to changes in assets than do the large sponsors’ grants.
For both medium and small sponsors, grantmaking increases significantly with increases
in contributions, assets, and number of accounts. Again, we find that donor-advised funds
sponsors are not granting solely based on assets and that there is significant variation
between different sizes of sponsors.
[Table 5. Here]
Payout Rates and Flow Rates by Type and Size.
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Knowing that type and size affect the relationship between grants other DAF
variables, we also explored categorical effects on the metrics of payout rates and flow
rates. If we track payout rates and flow rates over time, we see differing trends in each
category. Figure 3 shows the longitudinal trends of the median payout and flow rates
from a balanced panel of organizations by type and size. In Figure 3(a) we see that
community foundations have consistently lower payout rates, and Figure 3(b) shows that
single-issue charities have consistently higher flow rates. Figure 3(c) displays
consistently higher payout rates among large organizations. We tested categorical
differences in the metrics with pooled quantile (median) regressions of the payout rates
and flow rates by size and sponsor type and found that each of these differences was
significant at the 0.05 level. (Appendices A1 and A2). Figure 3(d) shows a peak in flow
rates among all sizes in 2008-2009 (an indicator of the economy’s influence on flow
rates), with flow rates dropping more substantially among large organizations in later
years.
[Figure 3 Here]
DAF Activity and the Economy
We have already noted that payout rates and flow rates both peaked during
recession periods with fiscal year ends in 2008 and 2009. Median payout rates peaked in
2008 at 16%, and median flow rates peaked in 2009 at 103%. Two patterns help explain
these phenomena. First, by all measures – sum total, median, and means – grants actually
increase in fiscal year 2008 (see Table 1), during an economic recession. Contrast this
phenomenon with the drop in overall charitable giving from individuals and private
foundations during this same year (Reich & Wimer, 2012). The increase in the value of
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grants going out of DAFs, however, corresponded with a decrease in both the value of
contributions coming into DAFs and asset values. These conditions led to the highest
ever payout rate among donor-advised funds. The second pattern, which helps to explain
the increase in flow rates, is that grants out of DAFs did not drop as much as
contributions between 2008 and 2009 (see Table 1). During the first two years of the
recession, 2008 and 2009, contributions dropped substantially each year – similar to the
decreases in all charitable giving (Reich & Wimer, 2012). While grants did decrease from
2008 to 2009, they only decreased by 7% of the aggregate total, compared to a 36%
decrease in contributions into DAFs.
In order to more deeply explore how DAF activities relate to the economy, we
merged the panel data with specific macroeconomic indicators that are known to correlate
with other forms of charitable giving: GDP, the S&P 500 index, Consumer Confidence
Index (CCI), and unemployment rates5 (List & Peysakhovich, 2011; Parth, Wilhelm,
Rooney, & Brown, 2003). Our measure of GDP came from Macroeconomic Advisers
(2017), the S&P 500 index numbers came from Cboe (2017), the Consumer Confidence
index from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2017), and
unemployment statistics from Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017). We used monthly
statistics from 2007 to 2016 for each indicator because sponsor organizations had
different months for their fiscal year end. If a sponsor reported their fiscal year end as
September, the economic factors merged with that sponsor’s data were for the month of
September in each year. In this way, changes in the economy and changes in DAF
metrics are aligned by month to reduce unintended lagged effects.
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First, we scrutinized a correlation matrix of the macroeconomic indicators and
DAF variables (Appendix A3) to detect patterns in significant correlations (see List &
Peysakhovich, 2011). We found that changes in contributions into DAFs correlated
significantly with changes in the GDP, and changes in asset values correlated
significantly with changes in the S&P 500 index. DAF grants, interestingly, did not
correlate with either of these economic variables. Because GDP and the S&P 500 seemed
to be the most influential correlates with DAF activity, we used those two
macroeconomic factors as our indicators for recession conditions. We coded dummy
variables for 12 month periods in which the GDP had a negative change (GDP recession)
or a positive change (GDP growth), and likewise for the S&P 500 index. Note that GDP
and the S&P index do not follow each other exactly. So, there are 12 month periods when
one may increase while the other decreases. We track both to see if DAF activity may be
more sensitive to one or the other indicator.
In Figure 4, we present the Kernel density plots of the three DAF metrics of
interest (grants, payout rates, and flow rates) during periods of economic growth and
recession (measured by GDP and S&P). Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show the distribution of
the percent changes in grants during years with different economic conditions. During
recessions (blue dotted line), organizations do not dramatically change grantmaking. The
shift to the left in the distribution of percent changes in granting during GDP recessions
indicates that a slightly larger proportion of sponsors had decreases in grantmaking
during recessions. Looking at payout rates in both Figures 4(c) and 4(d), the shift to the
right in the distribution indicates that, during both GDP and S&P recessions, substantially
more sponsors had large payout rates above 15 or 20 percent. For flow rates, shown in
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Figures 4(e) and 4(f), the flattening of the distribution and shift towards the right also
indicates substantially more sponsors with higher flow rates during the recession. In the
GDP recession graph, there is a marked increase in the proportion of sponsors with flow
rates above 100 percent, which indicates that these organizations were granting more than
they received in contributions. These distributions begin to suggest that donor-advised
fund granting stayed largely consistent during the recession, despite changing economic
conditions and organizational inputs.
[Figure 4 Here]
We next test if these changes during recession conditions vary by sponsor type
and size and are statistically significant. We begin by running t-tests for the differences of
means in the percent changes in our three DAF metrics during economic growth versus
recession. We then analyze these differences according to the size and type of the sponsor
organizations (Appendices A4, and A5). Overall, average grants during GDP recession
are 4.5 percentage points less than average grants during GDP growth. They are not
significantly different in S&P recession. Average payout rates are 2.1 percentage points
and 0.9 percentage points higher during GDP and S&P recessions respectively. Likewise,
flow rates are 12.1 percentage points and 3.4 percentage points higher during GDP and
S&P recessions respectively. Of the three sponsor types, community foundations had the
largest percentage decrease in grants (in GDP recessions) and the largest increase in
payout and flow rates (in both GDP and S&P recessions). Only the changes in
community foundations were significant at the 0.05 level. National sponsors and singleissue charities had overall increases in their rates, but had so much variance, the changes
were not significant. When looking at size groups, the medium-sized DAFs were the only
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group where payout rates were significantly higher in both forms of recession. The most
striking changes were the average flow rates in the large ($1B+ in assets) sponsors, which
were 50 percentage points and 30 percentage points higher during GDP and S&P
recessions, respectively. The higher flow rates among large DAF sponsors during
recession indicate that large DAFs are granting more from contributions than from assets.
Finally, we ask whether the changes in DAF metrics (grants, payout rates, and
flow rates) differ according to the magnitude of the changes in the economy. For each
level of change in the economy in our data, we calculate the point estimates for percent
change in grants and the point estimates for payout rate and flow rate. Figure 5 shows the
point estimates and 95% confidence intervals, which vary in width based on the number
of observations (and to a lesser extent the variation) at each level of recession. The figure
shows different patterns of DAF activity for recession and growth conditions. The nonparametric regression displayed in these figures adds additional insight to our t-test
results. In the t-test, most of the recession periods measured were severe recessions, while
many of the growth years were minor growth years, leading to a larger difference in
grants.
[Figure 5 Here]
We see in Figure 5 that the point estimates for changes in grants are actually
higher during slight GDP recessions (but with much larger confidence intervals), and that
increases in grants are also present during the smallest decreases in S&P. As recessions
are more severe, there is a trend for grants to also decrease. However, many of these
changes are not significant, and the most severe GDP recession still has a positive point
estimate for changes in grants, though it is not significant at the .05 level. This suggests
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that donors' grantmaking is affected by the severity of recessions, but the relationship
may not be linear. It is important to note that in slight recessions, the assets are still
contracting, thus an increase in grants is countercyclical to what would be expected.
Payout rates seem to increase with more severe recessions, which is explained by greater
drops in asset levels, but relatively smaller drops in granting. Flow rates seem to follow a
similar, but less dramatic, pattern, signaling that the contributions are not dropping as
much as assets during more severe recessions. What we learn from these analyses is that
DAF granting differs according to the magnitude of changes in the economy. Overall, we
see donor-advised fund sponsors continued to distribute money in a way that was resilient
to the economic downturn.
Discussion and Conclusions
This article introduces donor-advised funds, reviews some main issues salient to
public policy discussions, and presents some of the first organizational-level analyses
from a sample that approaches the full, active population. The new data provided in this
article pulls back the curtain on the mostly aggregate numbers that we have hitherto seen
in the reports and articles about donor-advised funds. We are beginning to understand the
complexity and heterogeneity of this increasingly important subset of nonprofit
organizations.
One of the main contributions of this paper is the statistical evidence for
heterogeneity among various types and sizes of DAF sponsors. Much attention has been
given to the largest DAF sponsors, such as Fidelity, Vanguard, Schwab, and National
Philanthropic Trust. It is readily apparent that the activities of such organizations
dominate the national trends. It is almost impossible to talk about “normal” donor-
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advised funds by looking at national sums, because they are strongly influenced by the
largest sponsors. By segregating these larger organizations in our analysis, we can study
the other 99% of donor-advised funds more effectively. This work highlights the
skewness of DAF data and contributes to researchers’ ability to more accurately analyze
and discuss them. We hope that future discussions about donor-advised funds will no
longer assume that the “average” DAF sponsor is just a smaller version of Fidelity
Charitable. We see from our data that smaller and medium donor-advised fund sponsors
behave differently than the large ones, and community foundations, single-issue charities
and national sponsors each behave differently.
Using organization-level data also uncovers evidence that donor-advised funds
are a more mainstream philanthropic vehicle than some have suggested. Our data
suggests a lower average account level than was previous supposed from the aggregate
data (c.f. Andreoni, 2017). This is supported by evidence that the number of DAF
accounts is rapidly increasing. National Philanthropic Trust found a 60% increase in the
number of donor-advised fund accounts in 2017 and a 20% decrease in the average
account balance (National Philanthropic Trust, 2018). Callahan’s (2017) book about
ultra-wealthy philanthropists suggests that DAFs are a tool for the wealthy to circumvent
regulations around private foundations. The Economist (2017) also suggested that donoradvised funds are primarily a tax saving vehicle for the philanthropy of the extremely
wealthy. While DAFs may be used to maximize tax advantages among elite wealth
holders, we find evidence suggesting DAF proliferation among a broader base of
charitable donors.
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Our findings also suggest that DAF sponsors behave differently than private
foundations and require different metrics. Median and average payout rates are multiple
times higher than the 5-6% that private foundations pay out. In addition, DAF grants are
correlated closely with contributions. To measure this distinct phenomenon, we introduce
the flow rate metric, which we hope will lead to a more sophisticated understanding of
donor-advised funds. While payout rates are a critical measure of DAF activity, payout
rates do not fully or accurately describe the continual flow of money through donoradvised funds. Focusing on payout rates misguidedly equates donor-advised funds, which
make grants using a combination of contributions and assets, with private foundations,
which generally make grants using endowment earnings.
Much of the concern around donor-advised funds focuses on the fact that once
money is placed into a DAF account, there is no guarantee that money will be
redistributed (Daniels, 2015, Daniels & Lindsay, 2016b, Madoff, 2016b). Many reform
advocates fear that money will stagnate in donor-advised funds. When considering our
findings on this topic, it is important to reiterate that the data and analyses in this article
cannot be used to directly address the individual use of donor advised funds. While our
findings describe organizational behavior, they cannot describe how individuals use
DAFs. Inferring patters of individual behavior from ecological data, such as 990 returns,
involves multiple assumptions that cannot be supported by the data currently available on
donor-advised funds (King, 1997). Andreoni (2017) suggested that, from a public policy
perspective, one should focus on the aggregate activities, not individual accounts. While
the individuals may benefit from the tax advantages of donating to donor-advised funds,
the onus is on DAF sponsors to maintain a charitable purpose for their exempt status.
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When we analyze organizational-level DAF activity, we observe that DAF
grantmaking is relatively robust when compared to DAF assets and contributions. The
median payout rate is approximately 13%, indicating that funds for DAF grantmaking are
not generated solely from interest earnings. Median flow rates of 87% suggest that donoradvised funds act as pass-through philanthropic intermediaries, not as long-term parking
lots for charitable dollars. The rise of asset levels seems to be driven by the remainder left
in the accounts combined with compound interest. While researchers and policymakers
would ultimately like to know to what extent these patterns hold for individual DAF
accounts, these organization-level patterns are valuable because they can help researchers
and policymakers to compare DAFs to other nonprofit grantmaking institutions.
We also found that different types of sponsor organizations behave differently.
These differences in donor-advised funds sponsors presumably reflect the differences in
clientele across the organizations. Community foundation DAFs act more like
grantmaking foundations than other DAF sponsors. This suggests that those who use
community foundations take a more grant-on-earnings approach than those who use other
types of DAF sponsors. Community foundations significantly decreased their grants
during recessions, following the pattern of private foundations. Single-issue charities had
the highest flow rates, suggesting that they operate more as pass-through intermediaries,
functioning to liquidate assets and then distribute those assets quickly to related
charitable entities. More research will have to drill down on the various groups and
subgroups of donor-advised funds. For example, how do religious donor-advised funds
differ from other single-issue charities? Or how do urban community foundation DAFs
differ from those in rural communities? In regards to size, we see that smaller sponsors
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tend to have higher flow rates. Larger sponsors, however, have higher payout rates. These
patterns suggest that regulations meant to control payout rates would primarily affect
DAFs with smaller assets.
Our final analysis of donor-advised activities during recession conditions is
perhaps the most important contribution of this paper, when considering their place in the
nonprofit sector and society as a whole. Giving from foundations decreased as readily as
individual giving during the recession years of 2008-2009 (Reich & Wimer, 2012), when
nonprofits needed the money the most. During this time, donors with money in donoradvised fund accounts were uniquely positioned to continue to support the causes they
cared about. Our findings suggest that grantmaking from donor-advised funds is less
affected by economic recession than other forms of charitable giving. More research will
be needed to understand what charities benefit from this DAF recession giving.
Furthermore, policy makers may want to carefully consider the recession-resilient nature
of donor-advised funds as they formulate regulation for this growing form of
philanthropy.

Endnotes
1
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation granted $4.5 billion, and DAF grants from
Fidelity Charitable totaled $3.5 billion (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 2017; Fidelity
Charitable, 2017a).
2

The IRS reported that all DAF sponsors had a combined asset value of $52.9 billion for
that 2012 tax year, and the sample for this study has a combined asset value of $56.8
billion for fiscal year 2013. The difference is due to the panel data being organized by
fiscal year instead of tax year (calendar year), as well as some IRS file error as noted by
Arnsberger (2016).
3

NPT divides grants in a given year by the year-end assets of the previous year.
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4

Arnsberger divides grants in a given year by the year-end asset value in the same year
plus the grants for that year minus the contributions that year.
5

GDP and S&P 500 are inflation adjusted to 2012 dollars, and unemployment rates are
seasonally adjusted.
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Abstract
Donor-advised funds (DAFs) are changing the way that many people make charitable
donations to nonprofit organizations. Instead of giving cash or assets directly to a charity,
donors opt to use a donor-advised fund account, or “giving account,” as a philanthropic
intermediary. Recent proliferation of DAF usage has led to suggestions of tighter
regulations on this increasingly common form of philanthropy. This article reviews the
concerns around the growth of donor-advised funds and the related policy proposals
suggested by reformers. With consideration for the historical precedents of governing
philanthropic action and nonprofit organizations, I recommend a relatively conservative
approach to regulating donor-advised funds. Policy recommendations include minimum
requirements that would match regulations for charitable trusts, increase reporting, and
close loopholes that DAFs create for private foundations. The policy recommendations
are intended to maintain public trust in American philanthropy, preserve freedom for
individuals who wish to donate to charity, while promoting the best interests for the
nonprofit sector as a whole.
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Introduction
What makes donor-advised funds such a pressing public policy issue is the recent rapidity
of their growth. Over a thousand nonprofit organizations sponsor donor-advised funds,
and almost half a million Americans are now using them to make donations (National
Philanthropic Trust, 2018). Donor-advised funds emerged in the early twentieth century
and started becoming more popular after the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (TRA) (Berman,
2015). Over the last ten years, however, the number of DAF accounts has almost tripled –
from 156,620 in 2007 to 463,622 in 2017 (National Philanthropic Trust, 2018). Figure 1
shows the growth in assets, contributions and grants. The expansion of DAFs is largely
due to financial service providers, such as Fidelity Investments, which have entered the
charitable market with their own nonprofit subsidiaries, expanding this philanthropic
service to their broad client bases.

[Insert Figure 1 here]

The growth of DAF’s is “changing the landscape” of American Philanthropy, leading to
new forms of charitable organizations (Daniels & Lindsay, 2016). In 2017 alone, the
number of users jumped 60% (National Philanthropic Trust, 2018), largely due to the
advent of a new type of sponsor, which uses DAFs to facilitate workplace giving (see
Figure 2). For example, Benevity is a B-Corporation that partners with large
multinationals such as Microsoft and Coca-Cola to facilitate workplace giving through its
own donor-advised fund (Ebeling, 2018). These new users represent a younger, more
mainstream population of givers. More and more Americans, even the less wealthy, are
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giving through a DAF account. In 2017, DAFs received $29 billion in contributions,
representing more than 10% of all individual giving. Donor-advised funds are beginning
to rival private foundations in financial influence in the nonprofit sector. Total assets
under management at DAFs have grown to over $110 billion, and in 2017 DAFs granted
over $19 billion - almost 40% of the amount of money that private foundations granted
(National Philanthropic Trust, 2018). Amidst the change, policy makers question whether
more regulations are needed.
[Insert Figure 2 here]

Reform advocates have raised several reasons for concern about this meteoric growth.
These concerns involve three core issues: 1) the timing of donations made through DAFs,
2) transparency in giving through DAFs, and 3) the costs of DAFs to the public sector.
This article will analyze each of these concerns within the context of public policy history
relating to nonprofits and philanthropy. Frumkin (2006) described how changes in public
policy towards nonprofits can have unintended consequences. The purpose of the paper is
to address the critical concerns around donor-advised funds and make policy suggestions
considering the best interest of the nonprofit sector as a whole.

Historical Context

In 1969, Congress singled out private foundations as philanthropic organizations that
needed to be regulated more closely because of their rising prominence and influence in
society. Legislators determined that if wealthy individuals were going to have subsidized
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influence over society the public needed more accountability (Hall, 2006). Rules were
established to control tax benefits for contributing to private foundations; a mandatory
payout rate was designed to ensure granting that would keep pace with interest earnings;
and more stringent reporting requirements were enacted. Berman (2015) explained that
during this time, a tax attorney named Norm Sugarman recognized the benefits that TRA
offered public charities and began advocating ways that community foundations,
especially Jewish organizations, could benefit from the new law. He counseled
community foundations to use their public charity status to attract the money of wealth
philanthropist, while allowing them to maintain some control over their donations. The
new arrangements were eventually formalized with a private-letter ruling from the IRS
which allow the donors informal control, giving donors privileges to “recommend” or
“advise” the community foundations in how to use their philanthropic contributions.
These informal compacts eventually became what we now know as donor-advised funds
(Berman, 2015).

In the early 90’s, Fidelity Investments created its own version of the donor-advised fund
by establishing a public charity subsidiary knows as Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund. The
affiliate provided its clients a public charity option for directing donations that avoided
the regulations on private foundations – a convenient way to facilitate charitable gifts and
still keep the investments with the firm. The exempt status of these commercially
sponsored charities, also known as National Sponsor Organizations (NSOs) was
challenged by the IRS during the 90’s. The courts ultimately decided in favor of the
NSOs, granting them tax-exempt status as public charities (Colinvaux, 2017). The
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decision reaffirmed the historically broad definition of charitable purpose. This common
law ruling and the increasing popularity of donor-advised funds led other financialservice providers, as well as many other community foundations and various charities to
start their own DAFs as well. What’s important about this historical context is the fact
that donor-advised funds rose in large measure as a response to a piece of legislation that
was considered to be adversarial towards the sector. The regulations pushed donors to
find alternative ways to direct private philanthropy to preferred causes without costly
regulations. It is important to ask ourselves, how would donors respond to additional
policy regulating the use of donor-advised funds?

Frumkin (2006) argued that the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1969 led to unintended
consequences on the way that private foundations make grants for social purposes. In
response to more demanding regulations, private foundations professionalized and
bureaucratized their staff. This response led to higher administrative costs, meaning less
money for charitable recipients. Private foundations strengthened their professional
associations with each other in order to respond to regulation in a unified manner. This
formal association led to more homogenized approaches to grantmaking, involving fewer
transformative gifts and more, smaller, programmatic grants. Frumkin (2006) concluded
that these associational responses to TRA led to private foundations becoming more rigid
in their philanthropic activity, and thus less responsive to addressing large societal
problems.
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What approach should be taken when considering policies for donor-advised funds? In
her book Governing Nonprofit Organizations: Federal and State Law and Regulation,
Fremont-Smith (2004) advocated regulating nonprofits sufficiently to ensure public trust,
but restrainedly as to allow maximum freedom. She wrote:
The wise course, therefore, is to provide a sufficient degree of regulation of
charities to assure the public of the integrity of the sector, yet that it not be so
draconian as to limit its freedom to meet changing needs….
[The nonprofit sector] must be allowed the greatest degree of freedom to operate,
consistent with the need to assure the public of its integrity. (p.2)
Regarding the long history of government-nonprofit relations, Fremont-Smith (2004)
emphasized that government has generally taken a hands-off approach, so long as
nonprofit fiduciaries can maintain a position of trust with the public. The definition of
“public good” has traditionally been treated in the broadest sense from a public policy
standpoint. Government has extended to the nonprofit sector the freedom to generate
public goods in a multiplicity of ways, resulting in a plurality of causes, without
prescribing exactly what qualifies as charitable.

In the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Congress formally identified donor-advised funds
as a particular form of exempt organizations and began to require more reporting from
DAF sponsors. Specifically, they introduced the Schedule D into Form 990, which
requires the reporting of the number of accounts, aggregated contributions, aggregated
grants, and total asset value. In addition, DAF sponsors also report a list of grants made
to other charitable organizations on Schedule I. This initial regulation of donor-advised
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funds was designed primarily to increase accountability and transparency. It did not at all
alter the tax treatment of donor-advised fund contributions, which is currently identical to
other public charities. Whether donor-advised funds continue to enjoy relative freedom,
or whether they will be more tightly regulated is a matter of debate. This article will
review the major concerns about donor-advised funds and some potential regulations to
address those concerns, while trying to maintain as Fremont-Smith (2004, p. 2) put it,
“the greatest freedom to operate.”

Concerns of Reform Advocates
Several authors as well as legislators have raised important critiques of donor-advised
funds and called for reform in their treatment under the tax code (Andreoni, 2018;
Callahan, 2017; Colinvaux, 2017, 2018; Gelles, 2018; Hussey, 2010; Madoff 2014,
2016a, 2016b; Sherlock & Gravelle, 2012). These critiques have coalesced around three
key concerns. The first concern is about timing. Contributions to donor-advised funds are
immediately tax-deductible, but there is no guarantee that the money will be granted in a
timely manner to other public charities. The second concern is that DAFs create a
transparency loophole for grants from private foundations. The third concern is that
donor-advised funds offer their users distinct tax advantages, resulting in greater losses in
public revenues than other forms of giving. Addressing these concerns from a public
policy standpoint requires the consideration of how possible regulation of donor-advised
funds would affect the entire nonprofit sector.
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1. The Timing Issue.
Nonprofits generally prefer outright donations that are immediately spendable. Needs for
services are ever present, and financial demands are constant for most charities.
Sometimes nonprofits will set aside money in the form of an endowment, and only use
the interest from investments for operating expenses. Donor-advised funds are
somewhere in between these two models, and sometimes don’t fit either. Money that is
contributed to a donor-advised fund has no prescription for when it will be used. Each
donor decides when to make a grant out of his or her account. Like outright donations,
money can be given through a donor-advised fund to another charity almost immediately.
Like endowments, the money in donor-advised funds is invested, and the earnings are
available for distribution to charitable purposes. But unlike either of these two models,
money in a donor-advised fund could, theoretically, sit in the account earning interest
indefinitely. This is the problem. Madoff (2016b, p. 2) succinctly apprised, “Since federal
law doesn’t require DAF funds to ever be distributed, there’s no way to be sure the
money in them will ever flow to charities.” While contributions to donor-advised funds
are irrevocable, and can only be redistributed to a public charity, there is no guarantee for
when that will happen.

Several public policies have been suggested for how to deal with this problem. Some
have suggested a minimum payout rate, similar to to private foundations, but this idea has
some critical flaws when examined closely. Madoff (2016a) pointed out that the
minimum payout was designed for private foundations with the idea of perpetuity in
mind, and that donor-advised funds are not necessarily intended to exist in perpetuity.
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Current payout rates from donor-advised funds sponsors are generally well above the 5%
mark, which is the bright-line requirement for private foundations, with the median
payout rate hovering around 13% over the past ten years (Heist & Vance-McMullen,
2019). This figure is measured per organization, not each individual account, and thus
represents an aggregate of many accounts in one.

Colinvaux (2017) proposed that such a minimum be imposed only on the commercially
affiliated NSOs, recognizing that most of the other DAF sponsor organizations, such as
community foundations, exist for charitable purposes outside of hosting DAFs. The
minimum payout (at whatever rate) would be enforced by commercial sponsors on its
individual account holders to meet the minimum standard. NSOs serve no other
charitable purpose than to redistribute charitable money, and this would ensure that they
meet a “commensurate test” used to determine if a fundraising organization is adequately
fulfilling its charitable purpose (Colinvaux, 2017). Applying this regulation to NSOs
would protect the majority of sponsors such as community foundations and single-issue
charities from having to comply, but would affect the majority of DAF users. National
Sponsor Organizations serve a vast majority, 338,141 of the 463,622 account holders
(National Philanthropic Trust, 2018). Such a regulation would artificially incentivize
many donors to use community foundations or single-issue charities. Those who would
be most likely to move accounts would be those least likely to meet a minimum
requirement. Heist and Vance-McMullen (2019) found that community foundations and
single-issue charities already have historically lower payout rates than NSOs. How would
the migration of lower-rate DAF users to other charities improve the usefulness of DAFs
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to the nonprofit sector? For those who would keep their DAF accounts at an NSO, the
imposition of a minimum payout rate would likely diminish their flow of charitable
dollars, because they would use the minimum as an anchor in their charitable decision
making. Rooney (2017) explained that “a minimum payout rate for DAFs likely would
ossify the minimum into a new maximum as well—essentially causing, in other words, a
new standard of minimal compliance.” So, the minimum payout rate regulation would be
counterproductive to the way that donor-advised funds are used.

Another similar idea came from David Camp in 2014, then Chairman of the House Ways
and Means Committee, to impose a five-year payout period for when donations need to
be redistributed. This idea strikes more of a balance in maintaining some flexibility for
DAF users, while addressing the concern about money sitting in the account indefinitely.
Andreoni (2017) analyzed aggregated DAF data, and calculated a “shelf-life” for how
long money turns over at the organization level. He found that on the aggregate it takes
between 3 and 4 years for DAF sponsors to redistribute their moneys, taking a first-in
first-out approach. Again, the organizational data indicates that DAFs are out-performing
even this seemingly reasonable request. Heist and Vance-McMullen (2019) found that
money flows fairly consistently through donor-advised fund sponsors. When comparing
the value of grants being distributed by DAFs to the value of contributions being received
by DAFs, year-over-year, the median “flow-rate” is about 85%. This suggests that if the
median DAF sponsor receives $1 M in contributions in a given year, then it will give out
$850,000 in grants that same year.
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While these proposed regulations are well intended, after considering the empirical
evidence of how DAFs are being used, they seem a bit excessive. Implementing a
universal regulation for all DAF holders to ensure that money is being redistributed in a
timely manner, when the current data imply that DAF money is already flowing at a
reasonable rate overreaches the intended outcome. As the proverbial axiom goes, “if it’s
not broken, don’t fix it.” Fremont-Smith (2004) emphasized “[The nonprofit sector] must
be allowed the greatest degree of freedom to operate, consistent with the need to assure
the public of its integrity.” The aggregate data indicate that collectively speaking DAF
users are not abusing the flexibility of time allotted to them, but are gifting money out of
their donor-advised funds at reasonable rates and speed (Heist & Vance-McMullen,
2019).

Because the aggregate data does not represent individual behavior, consideration must be
given to those individuals who are outliers and do not follow the average organizational
behaviors. There is still a chance that some people are parking charitable dollars in
donor-advised funds, with no immediate intention for redistribution to charitable causes.
In fact, I have interviewed such DAF users, and found evidence that some people leave
money in DAF accounts with no plan for when to move it out. Why is it a problem? Even
though contributions into DAFs are irrevocable, the donations are subsidized by the
deductibility of the gift, and require some level of accountability to the public that the
money will be used to generate public goods. Private foundations are allowed to exist in
perpetuity, but they have a minimum payout to ensure that some money flows to the
public. With donor-advised funds, one could establish an account in perpetuity, with no
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requirement for any public benefit. The trick is to figure out a policy that prevents this
situation without impairing the charitable behavior of the vast majority of DAF givers.

Part of the solution lies within the sector itself. The nonprofit sector has a history of
employing self-regulation policies to promote best practices and cultivate public trust
(Brody, 2006). Hale (2013) wrote that formal regulation of nonprofits may not be suitable
to the public’s true concerns and that “normative sector values, such as trust and
collaboration” may be the best motivating force for improved nonprofit performance.
In a comparative analysis of European countries, Bies (2010) found that nonprofit selfregulation occurs where the sector is well established, but also found a professional type
of self-regulation in emerging nonprofit sectors where the legal systems are also
emerging. According to Institutional Theory, professional types of self-regulation enact
values-based policies designed to generate normative behavior meant to engender trust in
the organization (Bies, 2010). Given that DAFs are an emerging subsector in the United
States and that the legal regime relating specifically to DAFs is also emerging, we can
expect to find professional forms of self-regulation. For example, Fidelity Charitable
requires donors to grant a minimum average of 5% of assets annually over a five-year
rolling period. If this is not met, then Fidelity Charitable distributes money out of the
account in order to meet their own minimum requirement (Fidelity Charitable, 2018). Not
all sponsors have such a policy at this point, and legislation aimed at organizations could
be used to encourage or nudge them to adopt such policies.
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In determining what public policies would be appropriate to address the issue of
perpetuity without payout, two considerations should guide the process. The first
consideration has already been covered in large measure. That is, whatever policy is
implemented, this policy would be meant to control the few outliers that breach the
normal standard of redistributing DAF money for public use in reasonable time. It would
not be a policy for the average DAF user, but rather a stopgap for relatively few. The
second consideration is that we already have laws that govern similar forms of charitable
giving. Any regulation of DAFs that supersedes those imposed on other philanthropic
entities may be taken as unfair and punitive, and may merely shift behavior to other
charitable forms, just as the Tax Reform Act of 1969 inadvertently catalyzed the growth
of DAFs.

Tax-exempt charitable entities can take either of two basic forms: charitable trusts or
nonprofit corporations. The legal regimes governing both forms have the same intent – to
ensure charitable purposes and prohibit private inurement. Technically, donor-advised
funds sponsors are chartered as nonprofit corporations, but in practice they operate
similar to charitable trusts. Any regulation of donor-advised funds could be compared
with the treatment of charitable trusts, to determine fairness and propriety. In regard to
the timing issues, how is timing treated in charitable trusts? Many charitable trusts allow
a separation in timing between the tax-deductibility and the distribution of money for
public purposes. Split-interest trusts, such as charitable remainder unitrust (CRUTs),
provide a tax-advantaged contribution up front (prorated depending on the life of the
donor and the terms of the trust), and make the charitable distribution at the termination
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of the trust (usually the life of the donor). Comparing donor-advised funds to a charitable
remainder trusts, both are irrevocable and enjoy immediate tax advantages. DAF donors
receive no payments from split-interest, but do enjoy the flexibility of choosing multiple
charitable recipients at multiple periods of time. The one feature that DAFs lack, that
make CRUTs legally viable, is an ultimate remainder beneficiary. Should DAFs be
required to name a remainder beneficiary and an ultimate term of expiration, such as the
life of the donor, then the legal regimes governing the two forms would be equitable.

By establishing a lifetime term limit for donor-advised funds with a remainder
beneficiary, we answer the concern about when the money will be used for public
purposes. We do not accept a minimum payout, but we also remove the possibility of
perpetuity. We leave to the donor to decide, within his/her lifetime, when to designate the
irrevocable gift for its ultimate purpose. Some may argue that it is wiser to spend
charitable dollars in the present, when the needs are immediate. However, the strategic
decision of when to use philanthropic resources is a matter of personal philosophy about
social needs, involves the discounting of the future value of money, makes projections
about investment growth and predictions about future needs (Frumkin, 2006). Indeed, the
question of timing is as much a matter personal choice as any aspect of philanthropic
activity. Brody (2006) stated: “The absolute discretion of a donor to give or withhold
making a charitable gift—with whatever conditions the donor imposes—is, to some, the
essence of private philanthropy.” This essence of private philanthropy, the freedom to
choose when and how to give, has traditionally been given wide latitude under various
legal regimes. There is no good reason why donor-advised funds should be any different.
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2. The Transparency Issue.
One feature of donor-advised funds that makes them attractive to some donors, tricky to
manage for many development officers, and concerning for reform advocates is the
ability to give anonymously through a donor-advised fund. When donors establish DAF
accounts, they name them. Some name the account after themselves, some take the
opportunity to honor a beloved family member, and some use indistinctive titles, such as
“The Doing Good Fund.” No matter what the name of the account, giving through a
philanthropic intermediary adds a layer of separation between the donor and the nonprofit
recipient. This creates challenges for nonprofit managers and fundraisers. Moreover, even
those whose accounts reflect their own names may choose to make some of their grants
anonymously, which will withhold any identifying information from the charity.
Technically, it is the sponsor organization that is making the grant. While this creates
additional challenges for the grantees, it should not be considered illegal.

For individual donors, donor-advised funds offer a more strategic way to regulate their
direct acknowledgement and involvement with charities. Some donors do not want to be
known for differing reasons. They may value the principle of anonymity from an ethical
or moral perspective. Anonymity has long been praised as a virtuous aspect of charitable
giving (i.e. Maimonides’ eight levels of Tzedakah). They may not want to be constantly
solicited by nonprofits, which happens when people become known for making large
donations. So donor-advised funds offer a service to individual donors who desire less
transparency around their giving. Individual donors already enjoy the right to give
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directly to a nonprofit and keep that donation anonymous. Charities have the right to
maintain the confidentiality of their donors, and do not have to report who donated to
them. DAFS merely facilitate anonymity. Requiring individuals or DAF sponsors to
disclose all donations would be overreaching the current regulations of charitable giving
and raise serious ethical questions for those who value anonymity.

While we want to protect the freedoms of individuals, other entities that donate through
donor-advised funds may not warrant that same level of freedom. As Madoff (2014) and
Callahan (2017) have pointed out, private foundations are able to funnel money through
donor-advised funds anonymously, thus defeating one part of the regulations governing
them. One of the purposes of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 was to demand greater
accountability and transparency from private philanthropists who could yield significant
influence in society through publicly sanctioned foundations. The idea was to inform the
public on what causes private foundations support. Donor-advised funds offer private
foundations a loophole for this transparency regulation. Technically, a private foundation
can grant to a DAF first, then to another charity, and only report the grant to the DAF
sponsor, while the public remains uninformed about the ultimate recipient. Clearly this is
a breach of the standing legal structures governing private philanthropy. Future public
policy needs to close this loophole by disallowing private foundations the ability to grant
to donor-advised funds.

Related to this transparency loophole, donor-advised funds also offer private foundations
an out for meeting their minimum payout rate. Madoff (2014) explained, “Adding to the
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problem is that private foundations can meet their 5-percent payout rule simply by
transferring money to donor-advised funds rather than giving to real charities.” I have
interviewed philanthropists with private foundations who use the DAF as an “overflow”
fund during years when their foundations do not have enough qualifying grants to meet
their payout quota. Again, in support of the current legal framework, I advocate for a ban
on private foundation transfers to donor-advised funds. Doing so would close two
loopholes for private foundations – the ability to anonymize giving, and the ability to
defer their minimum granting.

Another issue relating to transparency comes from DAFs transferring money to other
DAFs. Oftentimes donors will open a different DAF account because of an easier
platform or an affiliation with a particular organization. While this is not illegal, and
allows for flexibility in the market, it does create some reporting opaqueness. When a
DAF sponsor returns Schedule D of the Form 990, it only reports the “aggregate value of
grants.” Right now, that aggregate value includes transfers to other DAF sponsors,
because they are technically 501(c)(3) organizations. This aggregate value can be
misleading when trying to determine payout rates and other measures of DAF activity. A
special report by Giving USA (2018, p. 29) reported that, “From 2012 to 2015, DAF-toDAF granting accounted for 4.4 percent of all dollars from donor-advised fund grants.”
DAFs do report a list of all of their grantees in Schedule I, but it is extremely difficult to
determine all of the DAF-to-DAF grants. In order to report these grants, there would need
to be a national registry of DAF sponsors, which is currently lacking, so that DAFs could
track grants to other DAFs by EIN. Ultimately, such a measure would not affect the
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philanthropic activity of donors, but bring greater accountability and transparency to this
unique subset of nonprofits.

3. The Cost Issue.

Smart donors can maximize the tax-advantages of giving by using a donor-advised fund.
In years when they experience a liquidity event, or realize a capital gain, donors give
some or all of the appreciated asset to a donor-advised fund. DAFs facilitate the reception
and liquidation of appreciated assets, including real-estate, closely held business stock,
and other complex gifts. In this way, the giver forgoes paying a capital gains tax on the
appreciation of the asset, but also receives a tax deduction for the fair market value of the
donated asset. While donations of appreciated assets to most public charities enjoy these
double benefits, similar gifts to private foundations are not valued at the fair market
value, but rather at the cost basis, and thus do not maximize the deduction (Andreoni,
2017).

This differentiation in treatment may seem unfair at first, but important distinctions
between private foundations and DAFs must be articulated. Donors who use private
foundations enjoy much more control over their charitable money than donors who give
through DAFs. Part of the 5% payout for private foundations may be used for
administrative costs of running the foundations which can be paid to oneself or a family
member. These administrative expenditures can include travel and other expenses related
to running the foundation. Distributions from foundations can be directed toward
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individuals or other causes, as the board of the foundation sees fit, not just grants to
public charities. By contrast, DAF users cannot pay themselves out of their DAF account
to administer their philanthropic activities; they cannot use DAF money for travel or
other personal expenses relating to their giving; and they can only forward their DAF
money to other qualified 501(c)(3) organizations. Comparing the tax-treatment of private
foundations to that of DAFs is not comparing apples to apples.

As mentioned before, donating appreciated assets to any public charity enjoys the double
tax advantage of avoiding capital gains tax and deducting the full market value. Donoradvised funds merely facilitate the reception of non-cash assets, and allow more
flexibility for how and when to distribute the charitable donation. Consider a real-estate
developer who wishes to give some property to charity. Donating an appreciated realestate holding that belongs to a family-run LLC may be a fairly complicated gift for a
small charity to receive, and the donor may not want just one charity to receive the gift.
The developer can gift the property into a donor-advised fund; the DAF sponsor
liquidates the assets; and then the donor can make cash grants out of the account to the
charities of choice whenever he or she decides. Savvy givers plan ahead and use DAFs
to bunch giving into one year, taking full advantage of their maximum percentage
(generally 50 percent) deduction from taxable income, and then take the standard
deduction in future years as they continue to give out of their DAF. This technique is
even more salient now with the recent doubling of the standard deduction. While these
features largely explain why DAFs have become so popular, they also make DAFs more
expensive for the government to sanction.
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Donor-advised funds help people maximize the tax-advantages of giving, especially for
those who have appreciated assets to give away, which generally means the wealthy
(Andreoni, 2017). From a public policy standpoint these tax advantages for the wealthy
represent a loss in tax revenues for the government. One question that reform advocates
have asked is whether or not it is worth it to the public to allow donor-advised funds?
Andreoni (2017) conducted a benefits and costs analysis of DAF activity, in an attempt to
answer this question. He found that DAF donors contribute about 15% more appreciated
assets, compared to high-income donors. He modeled the costs in tax-revenues lost and
the benefits in increased giving through DAFs. He concluded that DAFs help donors
minimize taxes more than they increase giving, resulting in a net loss for the public
sector. These findings offer an important piece of the puzzle for developing policy around
DAFs, but they do not represent the whole picture of DAF usage.

In his analyses, Andreoni (2017) compared DAF users to high-income (over $500,000)
itemizers from the Statistics of Income (SOI) data set from the IRS. This comparison was
based on the average DAF contributions, calculated by aggregated organizational data.
Heist and Vance-McMullen (2019) found that mean DAF statistics are highly skewed,
and do not accurately represent the heterogeneity among DAF sponsors. The net losses
reported by Andreoni may be limited to only the high-income segment of DAF user and
that segment may be smaller than previously suspected. In 2017, the number of accounts
jumped by 174,144 in one year. This increase was largely due to a huge influx of
corporate employees who signed up for donor-advised funds through the online giving
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platform Benevity. Ebeling (2018) reported that these donors work for large corporations
and are generally younger millennial employees. They mostly give out of their
paychecks, not appreciated assets, and most of these donors do not itemize their
charitable deductions (Ebeling, 2018). If this growing segment of DAF users do not
donate appreciated assets and do not itemize their deductions, then this influx of DAF
donors do not account for any losses in tax revenues. In terms of benefits to nonprofit
sector and society, future research will need to investigate if and how much such
platforms increase charitable giving. However, all of these employees work at
corporations that match employee giving (Ebeling, 2018). Given that we know that
matches effectively incentivize donors (Karlan & List, 2007; Eckle & Grossman, 2003,
2008), and assuming that this online platform facilitates the process of giving, which
reduces the transaction costs (c.f. Huck and Rasul, 2010), then we can assume that such
workplace giving platforms will increase charitable donations.

Not all regulations for donor-advised funds would affect such workplace givers. For
example, Andreoni (2017, p. 39) suggested limits on advantages for non-cash assets, or
“requiring non-cash contributions to DAFs be paired with additional cash contributions.”
Such measures would attenuate the cost of lost revenues to the IRS by forcing donors to
liquidate part of an asset and pay capital gains or donate cash from income which can be
deducted but does not avoid capital gains tax. Colinvaux (2017) identified one of the
problems of non-cash donations, that the value of the asset can change during the time
that it goes into the DAF and finally to the grantee. This is especially problematic if the
asset loses value after being transferred into the DAF, because the donor gets a deduction
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of the fair market value at the time of donation, which may be more than what the grantee
ultimately receives. In this case the donor receives a tax break that is not commensurate
with the benefit to the charity. To moderate this potential unfairness, Colinvaux (2017)
proposed a net-benefit-to-charity approach of valuing non-cash assets. This approach
would effectively reduce the tax-advantages for wealthy DAF donors.

The perception of the efficacy of regulating tax deductions for the wealthy largely
depends on their perceived purpose. In his history of the last 100 years of the tax
deduction (implemented in 1917), Duquette (2018) explained, “the contribution
deduction was created to encourage voluntary giving to public purposes by rich
industrialists who had made their fortunes in business.” The perception of the deduction
as a way to encourage giving has morphed into a perception of it being an implicit cost
for government (Duquette, 2018). In regards to donor-advised funds, if the purpose of the
charitable deduction is a cost to government that should be minimized, then the proposed
regulations mentioned above would be effective measures. If the purpose of the taxdeduction rules were to encourage the voluntary, private provision of public goods, then
such regulations would not be effective because they disincentivize donors by raising the
price of giving. From the perspective of nonprofit managers and fundraisers, such
regulations would be seen as disincentivizing major gift prospects. In professional
fundraising, some of the most vital donations for a nonprofit organization come from
major gifts and planned gifts which frequently involve the donation of appreciated assets
(Ciconte & Jacob, 2009; Dove, Spears, & Herbert, 2002; The Fundraising School, 2010).
DAFs are often used as intermediaries to liquidate such assets. Regulations limiting the
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ability of donors to utilize appreciated assets to make major gifts and planned gifts would
be counterproductive to the development of the nonprofit sector.

Evaluating the costs and benefits of DAFs to society and the nonprofit sector is a
complex and evolving task. While DAFs may decrease tax revenues from the wealthy,
they may also increase charitable giving among non-itemizers. A central element of this
question is whether DAFs increase total giving or if donations to DAFs substitute other
forms of charitable giving, resulting in a zero-sum situation. Rooney (2017) summarily
evaluated the question and noted that DAFs are not decreasing charitable giving. In
approaching the substitutes theory, there is a perception that giving in the US has
remained constant as a percentage of GDP over the past four decades (Perry, 2013).
However, this is not the case. List (2011) found that, “Charitable giving as a percentage
of GDP has climbed steadily since the mid-1990s, from roughly 1.5 percent to more than
2 percent today.” This growth in giving actually aligns historically with the proliferation
of donor-advised funds. Similarly, Duquette (2018) found that philanthropic giving as a
percentage of GDP has increased since the early twentieth century, due largely to tax
deductions for wealthy business owners . More research on donor-advised funds will be
needed to determine if they increase charitable giving, or if they merely act as substitutes
for other forms of giving.

Policy Recommendations

93

Given the reasons for concern about the growth of donor-advised funds, reform advocates
seek to protect public interests from a dramatic change in American philanthropy that is
not yet fully understood. The history of governing nonprofits sets a precedent for a laisezfaire approach to regulating charitable activity (Brody, 2006). The commercial aspect of
much of the DAF growth chafes the publicly-minded reform advocates, who are calling
for more aggressive treatment of an increasingly popular charitable industry.

Some of the concerns for misconduct and loopholes are obvious, others are much more
complex and remain under-researched. For those breaches of extant legal structures,
simple fixes may obviate the few participants who have found the cracks in the system.
For larger concerns over the nature of donor-advised funds as exempt entities and their
role in controlling vast amounts of publicly subsidized charitable dollars, the formation of
new public policies must carefully weigh the ramifications for current and future
developments in the nonprofit sector. The advent of the donor-advised fund, for better or
worse, was itself an unintended consequence of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Mindful of
the concerns of many reform advocates, in an attempt to preserve the public trust for the
nonprofit sector and to preserve as much freedom of the philanthropic activity of
Americans, I propose the following policy recommendations:
1.

Set a life-term for all donor-advised funds and require a remainder
beneficiary designation. By establishing a maximum payout period of the
donor’s life, the timing concern is addressed in a way that maintains the
maximum flexibility for donors, while preventing charitable funds to go
unused in perpetuity. This policy would effectively treat DAFs as charitable
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trusts with no split-interest and the option for earlier distributions. Such a
provision would not likely interfere with the vast majority of donors who use
DAFs for more immediate philanthropy, yet would prevent donors from
carelessly leaving publicly subsidized funds without a plan.
2. Prohibit Private Foundations from transferring funds to Donor-Advised
Funds. The most obvious violation of current legislation is the loophole for
private foundations to transfer money to DAFs either to avoid transparency or
to meet their minimum payout. Closing this loophole would prevent DAFs
from being misused as well as clarify their unique functions vis-à-vis private
foundations.
3. Mandate Reporting DAF-to-DAF transfers. Right now, it is difficult to
accurately ascertain how much of a DAF sponsor’s grants are sent directly to
operating charities and how much are merely transferring money to another
DAF. This opaqueness can lead to inflated estimates of grantmaking by DAF
sponsors. Requiring DAFs to distinguish between grants to operating public
charities versus other DAFs, will provide a higher level of transparency.
4. Do not limit the deduction for non-cash donations. While DAFs may cost the
federal government more than other forms of charitable giving in lost tax
revenues, because donors can use them to maximize current tax-advantages,
they should not be limited just for the sake of saving the federal government
money. We still do not fully understand if and how DAFs may increase
overall charitable activity. Any regulation that increases the price of giving for
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wealthy donors can frustrate nonprofits’ efforts to secure major,
transformative donations.
These four recommendations represent a policy approach that is designed to maintain the
public trust in the nonprofit sector and maximize the benefit of nonprofits, while
maintaining the maximum freedom for private citizens to exercise their voluntary desires
to serve public causes.

Discussion and Conclusion

As early as the Elizabethan Charitable Uses Act of 1601, governments have encouraged
private citizens to donate to public works and other charitable purposes. The United
States has developed one of the most vibrant and pluralistic voluntary sectors in the
world. State and Federal governments’ encouragement of charitable giving has been a
vital element to the flourishing charitable sector in the United States. Government has
also regulated philanthropic activity to ensure transparency and accountability of private
citizens who take advantage of the favorable tax rules designed to encourage giving. The
Tax Reform Act of 1969 singled out private foundations as needing more regulation,
which increased their accountability to the public, but also had inadvertent consequences
for the whole nonprofit sector. The propagation of donor-advised funds is one of those
consequences. Congress has since identified DAFs as a type of nonprofit that required
more public accountability, and through the Pension Protection Act of 2006 required
better reporting, but did not alter their financial operations.
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The rapid growth of donor-advised funds has rightly attracted critical attention from
reform advocates who have raised insightful concerns about their entry into the charitable
economy. Some of these concerns deserve immediate correction, while other concerns
raise rather controversial debates. While all of these concerns are important to debate and
consider, not all of them merit immediate action. Hundreds of thousands of people are
now using donor-advised funds, with hundreds of thousands joining every year. The more
we learn about their activity, the more we recognize the plurality of uses and the
heterogeneity of their clients. Making changes to the law in order to more tightly regulate
one segment of DAF users, like high-income itemizers, may inadvertently affect other
users, like millennial corporate employees, or the even rest of the nonprofit sector.

One of the big questions that needs much more exploration is if and how DAFs increase
charitable giving. From a behavioral economics perspective, when you decrease the price
of a product, increase the value of the product, and lower the transactions costs, you
would expect a much higher consumption of the product. These are the basic underlying
forces that are driving the growth of DAFs. Tax-advantages lower the price; the timing
advantages and flexibility increase the value of the philanthropic experience; and the
handling of complex non-cash assets, as well as the online, easy-to-use platforms
decrease the transaction costs for charitable giving. By the same rationale, we would
expect that this cheaper, better, easier form of charitable giving would increase overall
giving, but we are lacking any conclusive empirical evidence.
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Some may argue that charitable donations should not be allowed to sit in an account,
earning interest, while not being used to benefit the public. This matter of timing is
biased toward the present and is more a matter of personal philosophy about social justice
than a matter of legal correctness. Various forms of charitable trusts allow donors to defer
the distribution of their charitable dollars to a later date. The only legal precedent for
establishing a minimum payout is with private foundations, which regulations are
designed to allow for perpetuity. In lieu of an allowance for perpetuity with a forced
payout, I propose a life-term for the existence of a DAF account, essentially treating
DAFs as an irrevocable planned gift with the flexibility of early distributions. Such a
treatment would maintain equitable treatment across different forms of exempt entities.

Some flaws in the uses of donor-advised funds are obviously egregious and may easily be
corrected with simple regulations that would not affect the majority of donors.
Eliminating transfers from Private Foundations to DAFs would maintain the transparency
standards established by previous legislation and ensure that DAFs are not being
misused. More detailed reporting about grants going to other DAFs will also increase the
transparency in the sector and provide more accurate assessments of how money is
flowing through DAFs to other charities.

Until we can more fully understand how DAFs augment the nonprofit economy as a
whole, we must refrain from imposing reactive regulations designed to increase the price
of giving by the wealthy. In the meantime, more research must be conducted to better
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understand how DAFs encourage donations to charitable purposes, which is the primary
purpose of laws governing philanthropy.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The three articles found in this dissertation represent a seminal work in the research of
donor-advised funds. While the immediate findings of the articles may be the most
apparent contributions to the various bodies of literature to which they belong as well as
the fields of nonprofit studies and philanthropic studies in general, what I hope does not
get overlooked is the importance of multidisciplinary research in these fields and the
necessity for the convergence of social sciences in understanding the complexities of
nonprofit entities and philanthropic behavior. Donor-advised funds provide an urgent and
meaningful impetus for economists, social psychologists, law professors, political
scientists, public administration professors and the like to come together to wield the
various perspectives and disciplines in an attempt to improve knowledge and
understanding about such social phenomena.

Some groundwork has been laid for investigating the underlying behavior economic
concepts and theories that help to explain why individuals use donor-advised funds and
how these concepts can help us to understanding how lowering the price of giving and
increasing agency in giving leads to more donative behavior and high rates of giving.
One of the critical issues that was attempted in the original experiments but failed, was
measuring the effect of time on giving decisions. Given that the time is probably the most
important factor that increases the agency of the donor, more work needs to be done to
investigate how giving a donor more time to make a giving decision effects the way that
decision is made. Other features of donor-advised funds also need to be explored. For
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example, DAFs anonymity is not well understood. How often do donors give
anonymously through DAFs, why, and how does it affect their giving choices? Other
features include the ability to involve family in charitable decision making, or the choices
for investment of DAF assets, or the facilitation of non-cash assets. All of these issues
present new and exciting topics for research in nonprofit philanthropic studies. They will
require multidisciplinary approaches involving various techniques and theoretical
frameworks.

One of the biggest limitations of the dissertation is the lack of data on individual giving
behavior. Without individual-level data, so many of the most important questions about
donor-advised funds will go unanswered. The organization data gives us some indications
about trends and the various uses of DAFs based on differing sizes and types of sponsors,
but these differentiations are too simple to accurately describe the full population of DAF
users. Moreover, the heterogeneity of activity among sponsors may only be a reflection
of the heterogeneity that exists between individual DAF users. If heterogeneity between
organizations causes us reason for pause in developing policy to regulate DAFs, how
much more will the heterogeneity among individual DAF users be reason to think
critically about how public policy will affect the growing population of DAF users.

In order to pursue the critical research needed for understanding individual DAF usage, I
am currently working to compile samples of deidentified account-level data from a
representative sample of DAF sponsors. Once such data is available we can begin to
explore how various demographic factors relate to DAF usage; we can investigate the
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relationship between investment choices and charitable choices; we can research the
critical issue of timing in DAF giving, and truly begin to understand the flow of money,
and the life-cycle of DAF usage.
One of the main finding of article two was that DAFs are resilient to recession
economies, but we don’t know by what mechanisms this resilience is manifested. Are
there only certain types of DAF users that give in the recession, or those who have certain
levels of assets? DAFs may also be resilient to microeconomic shocks or changes. For
example, it could be that DAFs allow older Americans to continue or even increase
charitable giving post-retirement, when their income is diminished and limited. In other
words, how are DAF used at different stages of life? The bottom line is that we know so
little about who uses donor, how they use them, and why. For those who conduct research
in the area of charitable giving, philanthropy, and nonprofit studies, there is much work
to be done on understanding donor-advised funds. This work will require academics from
multiple disciplines as well as the collaboration of donor-advised fund sponsors and
users.

Charitable activity is one of the great mysteries of human behavior. Donor-advised funds
have given us a twist to how charitable giving is done in America. Unraveling this twist
allows us insight into the inner-threads of the act of give to others.
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